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I. INTRODUCTION
After the news stories that Google saved $60 billion in U.S. taxes using 
the so-called Dutch Sandwich scheme1 and that the European Commission
ordered Apple in 2016 to reimburse Ireland over $13 billion for tax benefits
received by its Irish subsidiaries,2 even a casual news reader understood 
that Apple, Google, and many other multinational companies used a tax
planning strategy that shifted profits offshore to a tax-friendly country to 
reduce its tax liability in the United States and abroad. Because so many
multinational companies engage in this type of investment in a foreign 
country, referred to as foreign direct investment (FDI), tax scholars frequently 
examine the strategies employed by multinational companies when routing
FDI into a foreign country.3 
 1.  See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 707– 
14 (2011); Jesse Drucker, “Dutch Sandwich” Saves Google Billions in Taxes, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 22, 2010, 1:26 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39784907/ns/
business-us_business/t/dutch-sandwich-saves-google-billions-taxes/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4R8E-3CFV]; Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Is Lost to Tax 
Loopholes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html 
[https://perma.cc/NNY3-MLLS].
 2.  See generally Chris William Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International
Tax and Ownership Nationality, 68 TAX L.REV. 207 (2015). In regard to Apple’s tax strategy,
see, for example, Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple Inc.)
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Sen. Comm. on Homeland Sec. 
& Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong., 152–91 (2013), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
CHRG-113shrg81657/html/CHRG-113shrg81657.htm [https://perma.cc/8QZG-CU2C];
Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-
aims-at-low-tax-states-and-nations.html [https://perma.cc/D3GA-HZDZ]; James Kanter
& Mark Scott, Apple Owes $14.5 Billion in Back Taxes to Ireland, E.U. Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/technology/apple-tax-eu-ireland.html 
[https://perma.cc/76WD-7NB8].
3.  FDI is usually defined as ownership of foreign investors of a controlling form, 
typically at least 10% of voting stock in the local investing entity. Michael J. Graetz & Itai
Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REV. 537, 547 (2003). There
is plenty of traditional international tax scholarship accumulated with regard to FDI, so 
the examples of multinational enterprises (MNEs) are easily caught by international tax 
policy radar screens, attracting constant attention from the public and academia.  For FDI 
in general, see for example, Pol Antràs, Mihir A. Desai & C. Fritz Foley, Multinational
Firms, FDI Flows, and Imperfect Capital Markets, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1171 (2009); Lars P. Feld
& Jost H. Heckemeyer, FDI and Taxation: A Meta-Study, 25 J. ECON. SURV. 233 (2011);
Roger H. Gordon & James R. Hines Jr, International Taxation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 8854, 2002).
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But what do we know about the tax strategies of foreign indirect investment, 
or fund investment in usual terms,4 that is distinguished from FDI? This 
type of investment happens via multinational funds managed by large
investment management firms like Blackstone, KKR, or Apollo Global 
Management,5 as shown in Figure 1 below. Figure 1 is publicly disclosed 
in a financial statement of Apollo Global Management. However, it is hard 
to understand the exact fund investment structure by just looking into Figure 1. 
Moreover, plenty of resources focus on the multinational companies’ tax
strategies in foreign direct investment, both to attack and to defend such
strategies,6 but little research has been done to date analyzing the tax
consequences of foreign indirect investment managed by multinational
fund managers. On the one hand, are there any harmful tax practices in
multinational indirect investment comparable to FDI? On the other, are there 
any disadvantageous aspects of tax law for multinational indirect investment? 
Existing rules and literature gradually have come to recognize the lack 
of systemic rules for foreign indirect investment as part of an issue in
portfolio investment.7  However, given that portfolio investment refers to 
a passive feature of investment with less than 10% ownership and does not 
necessarily overlap with indirect or fund investment, the existing studies
do not offer clear answers to the above questions relating to fund investments 
in particular.8 
4.  In this Article, “indirect investment” refers to an investment that pools capital 
for investment from multiple investors and invests in the underlying assets through vehicles,
such as funds, trusts, or other entities. It is commonly called “fund investment” or “collective
investment,” although the definitions of each do not necessarily refer to the same thing.
5.  Blackstone, KKR, and Apollo Global Management, LLC are New York-based
private equity houses, ranked at second, third, and fourth, respectively, in 2018 in PRIVATE
EQUITY INT’L, PEI 300, at 24 (2019), https://d16yj43vx3i1f6.cloudfront.net/uploads/2019/ 
07/300_PEI_Jun_Digi.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9DT-73Q2]. 
 6.  See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
 7.  See, e.g., DORON HERMAN, TAXING PORTFOLIO INCOME IN GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 201 (2002); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A 
Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1331 (1996); Graetz & Grinberg, supra 
note 3, at 547–48; Yaron Z. Reich, Taxing Foreign Investors’ Portfolio Investments in the 
U.S.: Developments & Discontinuities, 16 TAX NOTES 1975, 1976 (1998) (focusing on 
inbound Foreign Portfolio Investment). 
 8.  See generally Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Carried Interest and Beyond: The 
Nature of Private Equity Investment and Its International Tax Implications, 37 VA. TAX 
REV. 421 (2018). 
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FIGURE 1. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF APOLLO GLOBAL 
MANAGEMENT9 
9.  Apollo Glob. Mgmt., LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 80 (Feb. 13, 2017). 
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Furthermore, the recent tax reform in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)
of 2017 adopted many changes in the U.S. international tax system, including
many provisions that exempt U.S. taxpayers foreign source income from 
taxation.10 However, such change is again limited to FDI, and the tax reform
is silent on the foreign indirect investment by multinational funds.11 
To fill the gap in the underdeveloped international tax law for indirect 
fund investments, this Article proposes a general rule of pass-through taxation 
in international tax law and demonstrates the feasibility of its implementation 
in the case of private equity funds (PEFs) in particular.12 The Article primarily 
deals with taxation on multinational fund investments involving intermediary 
entities in one or more jurisdictions. 
For example, Figure 1 depicts a simplified version of a PEF’s firm structure. 
It shows multiple offshore portfolio companies at the bottom of the structure
but does not clearly show the specific intermediary entities in foreign countries 
in the middle of the structure. If one picks a vertical slice of the structure 
for one portfolio company and expands it with greater detail, the picture 
looks like Figure 2.
10. See I.R.C. § 245A (2012). For general introduction to the international tax 
provisions in the TCJA, see generally Susan C. Morse, International Cooperation and the
2017 Tax Act, 128 YALE L.J.F. 362 (2018). Such change made the U.S. international tax
system depart from the worldwide tax system that taxes U.S. taxpayers’ worldwide income. 
However, the TCJA did not fully embrace the territorial tax system that entirely exempts 
U.S. taxpayers’ foreign source income from taxation, because it maintains the Subpart F regime
and adds a minimum tax on global low-taxed intangible income (GILTI).  Id. at 368. 
11. The TCJA of 2017 introduced provisions where dividends received by a U.S. 
corporation from foreign subsidiaries are generally exempted from tax. See I.R.C. § 245A.  
However, this change does not apply to dividends received by noncorporate taxpayers, 
such as PEFs and their individual partners. JASON FACTOR &MEYER FEDIDA, CLEARY GOTTLIEB, 
TAX CUTS & JOBS ACT: CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUNDS 5 (2018), https://www.clearygottlieb. 
com/~/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/2017/publications/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-2017/ 
updates-1-2-18/tcja-summary--private-equity-jan-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/49JW-ZPPP].
12. Cf. Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Taxing International 
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX 
L. REV. 261, 327 & n.254 (2001) (arguing that international tax policies on FDI and foreign 
indirect investment should be studied separately, and noting that a proposal of appropriate 
rules for venture capital funds abroad has rarely been made).  This Article focuses on  PEF  
among various types of investment funds because the information hurdles discussed in Part 
V would be easier to overcome in the PEF context than in others.  Furthermore, the nature 
of PEF is distinguished from other investment funds, especially mutual funds, in many aspects.  
See generally Kim, supra note 8. 
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FIGURE 2. STRUCTURE OF THE LONE STAR FUND CASE13 
13. This chart is reconstructed by the author based on the chart in Appendix 2, Table 
2 of the 2009 Seoul Administrative Court case. Seoul Administrative Court [Seoul Admin. 
Ct.], 2007Guhap37650, Feb. 16, 2009, (app. 2, tbl.2), aff’d, Seoul High Court [Seoul High
Ct.], 2009Nu8016, Feb. 12, 2010, aff’d, Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Du5950, Jan. 27,
2012 (S. Kor.). Lone Star Funds is a Texas-based private equity house, ranked twentieth 
in PRIVATE EQUITY INT’L, THE 300 BIGGEST PRIVATE EQUITY GROUPS ON THE PLANET PEI










    
     
     
 
   
  
 
   
   
   
     
     
     
   
    
 
  
            
 
        
  
      
 
     
    
 
         
      
      
    




        
       
    
   
This Article analyzes the investment structures of multinational funds
and offers paradigm cases to lay the groundwork for proposing pass-through 
taxation.  In the paradigm cases, there are at least three relevant tax jurisdictions: 
(1) the source country where the income is produced—South Korea in
Figure 2; (2) the residence country where investors who realize the foreign- 
source income are residing—Unites States, among others, in Figure 2;14 
and (3) the intermediate country where intermediary entities are allegedly 
residing—Belgium, Luxembourg, and Bermuda in Figure 2. The consequence 
of pass-through taxation within international tax regimes will be to eliminate
the tax relevance of entities in those intermediate countries. 
In domestic tax systems, indirect investment like fund investment typically
does not entail entity-level taxation.15 Investors thus enjoy tax neutrality 
between indirect and direct investment because most countries offer pass-
through tax systems, such as partnership taxation, for fund investment.16 
In other words, an individual person investing in stock of a company through
a fund vehicle pays the same amount of tax on the investment return, such
as dividends and capital gains, as they would have had they invested in that
stock directly without using a fund vehicle. 
In contrast, investors in international fund investment may not enjoy tax
neutrality between direct and indirect investment. As a formal matter, current 
international tax rules do not entirely eliminate entity-level taxation in indirect 
investment, especially when the investment structure is spread across multiple 
countries.17 The opacity of fund vehicles in intermediate countries makes 
it hard to look through the vehicles and tax investors in a residence country,
14. The category of source country versus residence country maps very roughly on 
to that of developing versus developed country in non-tax terminology.  Although the parallels 
are not exact, a large number of source countries are developing countries, such as Brazil,
Russia, India, and China (BRIC), and a large number of residence countries are developed 
countries, such as the members of the OECD. See TAX JUSTICE NETWORK,TAX JUSTICE BRIEFING:
SOURCE AND RESIDENCE TAXATION 2–3 (2005), https://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/
Source_and_residence_taxation_-_SEP-2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/762R-8QQL].
15. See DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22689, TAXATION OF HEDGE
FUND AND PRIVATE EQUITY MANAGER 2–3 (2014). 
16. Therefore, investing through a pass-through entity was preferred to a taxable
corporation before the TCJA. However, the TCJA reduced the statutory corporate tax rate 
from 35% to 21%; thus, investing through a taxable corporation can sometimes be better
than investing directly, at least domestically. See, e.g., Joshua Franklin, Private Equity
Firm KKR Opts To Become C-Corp After U.S. Tax Reform, REUTERS (May 3, 2018, 4:01
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kkr-results/private-equity-firm-kkr-to-convert-
to-a-corporation-after-u-s-tax-reform-idUSKBN1I4164 [https://perma.cc/9H9S-F6J4].
Nonetheless, this explanation on comparing taxable corporations and pass-through entities
for tax purposes does not uphold in the multi-jurisdictional analysis, as explained in the
next paragraph of the text, especially when the intermediary entity is usually required to promptly
distribute funds. 
17. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 8, at 443–45. 
714
POST CHRISTINE KIM PAGES2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/15/2019 10:18 AM        
             
     
  
    
   
   
         
 
     
 
  
        
        
  
   
 
    
   
 
         
     
   
        
  
    
 
   
     
     
     
  
[VOL. 56: 707, 2019] Engineering Pass-Throughs in International Tax 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
as income is distributed from the source country. Thus, investors may not 
claim tax treaty benefits mitigating potential double taxation18 that ought
to be available in direct investment, and they end up with tax consequences 
worse than direct investment. 
As a result, investors have created many strategies to reduce tax liabilities
in relevant countries to achieve the tax consequences that they would have 
enjoyed in a domestic tax environment.19 Such planning might be understood
as a sort of self-help path to tax neutrality between direct investment and 
indirect investment. 
Sometimes, however, investors take further steps to continue to minimize 
their tax liability by taking advantage of underdeveloped and unclear rules. 
Such aggressive practices include treaty shopping,20 the use of a hybrid
instrument or entity that produces a mismatch in tax treatment in different
countries—hybrid mismatches,21 and tax secrecy.22 Most of these practices
are offered by the intermediate countries rather than by traditional source 
or residence countries.23 These practices have been criticized for jeopardizing 
tax bases,24 but it is hard to eradicate them piecemeal because they often 
18. Double taxation occurs in international tax when a source country and residence 
country levy tax on the same declared income.  See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax 
Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131, 133 (2001).  Many 
countries enter into income tax treaties to avoid such double taxation.  Under the tax treaties, 
source countries offer the reduced withholding tax rates for aliens’ income from domestic 
sources, whereas residence countries offer tax exemption or credit to foreign-source income.  
See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXT, AND PROBLEMS ¶ 1240, at 63 (4th ed. 
2011).
19. See Gregg D. Polsky, A Compendium of Private Equity Tax Games, 146 TAX
NOTES 615, 616 (2015).
20. See infra Sections III.A.2, III.C.2. 
21. OECD defines a hybrid mismatch arrangement as “a profit shifting arrangement 
that utili[z]es a hybrid element in the tax treatment of an entity or instrument to produce a 
mismatch in tax outcomes in respect of a payment that is made under that arrangement.”  
OECD, BEPS ACTION 2: NEUTRALISE THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS 
(RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DOMESTIC LAWS) 8 (2014); see infra Sections III.A.2, III.C.2. 
22. See infra Sections III.A.2, III.C.1. 
23. See Bret Wells & Cym Lowell, Tax Base Erosion and Homeless Income: Collection
at Source Is the Linchpin, 65 TAX L. REV. 535, 543–44 (2012). 
24. See, e.g., Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, The End of Bank Secrecy? An 
Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown, 6 AM. ECON. J. 65, 66 (2014). See generally
OECD, COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT








    
 
    




   
 
  
      
   
 
    
  
 
    
   
 
  
     
 
 




   
 
    
     
   
      
   
   
      
     
     
 
       
   
  
     
 
  
comply with legitimate tax rules of the intermediate countries.  Thus, instead
of attacking individual planning techniques one by one, a new, systematic
approach to international fund investment is needed.
Recognizing this need to develop a general rule of pass-through taxation in
multinational fund investments, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) has attempted to develop one since the 1990s.  
The first outcome, released in 1999, is the OECD Partnership Report, which 
did not address the problem because it still tried to apply traditional bilateral 
rules to more complicated situations.25 Then, the OECD released a report 
on Collective Investment Vehicles (CIVs), which refers to mutual funds,
in 2010.26 However, the report did not address non-CIV funds, such as private 
equity or hedge funds, that are of this Article’s interest.  In 2016, as part of 
its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project,27 the OECD began
discussing non-CIV funds.28 
The bright side of these efforts is that the OECD is endeavoring to accomplish
tax neutrality in multinational fund investment. For example, a discussion 
9UEF-LAKN]; OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS,
ACTION 2–2015 FINAL REPORT (2015), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/715eutralizing-
the-effects-of-hybrid-mismatch-arrangements-action-2-2015-final-report_9789264241138-
en#page1 [https://perma.cc/SRK3-CHHR]; OECD, PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY
BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, ACTION 6–2015 FINAL REPORT (2015), https:// 
read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/preventing-the-granting-of-treaty-benefits-in-inappropriate-
circumstances-action-6-2015-final-report_9789264241695-en [https://perma.cc/V76G-496D].
25. See generally OECD, THE APPLICATION OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION 
TO PARTNERSHIPS (1999), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/the-application-of-the-
oecd-model-tax-convention-to-partnerships_9789264173316-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/ 
S3FH-ZBS6]; OECD, The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships, 
in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 2010, at R(15)-1 (2012), https://   
read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-2010_ 
9789264175181-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/C4SR-APMR] [hereinafter OECD, PARTNERSHIP
REPORT].
26. See generally OECD, The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income 
of Collective Investment Vehicles, in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL
2010, supra note 25, at R(24)-1 [hereinafter OECD, CIV REPORT].
27. Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) refers to tax strategies that enable
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) to avoid paying tax on their global income to any country, 
or only to pay tax at nominal rates, by eroding their tax base through generating— 
or double-dipping—deductions or credits, or by shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions.
See OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 5–6 (2013), https://read.oecd-
ilibrary.org/taxation/addressing-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264192744-en#page7 
[https://perma.cc/6EMV-ACSW]. G20 and the OECD regarded this problem seriously and
launched a project to address it through global cooperation in February 2013. See id. 
28. See, e.g., OECD, PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFT: TREATY ENTITLEMENT OF NON-
CIV FUNDS (2016), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/BEPS-consultation-treaty-entitlement-
non-CIV-funds.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K8U-H3NY] [hereinafter OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION 
DRAFT]; see also OECD, BEPS  ACTION 6: DISCUSSION DRAFT ON NON-CIV EXAMPLES
(2017), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/Discussion-draft-non-CIV-examples.pdf [https://
perma.cc/74FF-38H2] [hereinafter OECD, DISCUSSION NON-CIV EXAMPLES].
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draft on the OECD’s policy for non-CIV funds suggests that as long as a 
fund distributes 100% of its income to its investors on a regular basis, its
tax consequences would be eliminated.29 Jointly, the tax consequences of 
the investors would be determined by considering only the source country
and residence country.30 However, the discussion regarding both CIV and
non-CIV funds is limited to only the tax treaty entitlement issue.  Tax treaties,
for instance, are an important source of international tax law. Yet, when
the fund investment is spread across multiple countries, it is highly likely
that at least some of the countries do not have treaty networks with other 
countries involved in the investment structure. Focusing on treaty entitlement
may resolve the treaty shopping issue, but that is only a partial solution to
the overall problem of multinational indirect investment.
Furthermore, the OECD’s approach basically gives intermediate countries 
primary authority to determine overall tax consequences of non-CIV funds, 
collect tax on behalf of both the source and residence countries, and then 
remit the tax to each of them.31 Its approach requests the source and residence
countries to comply with the so-determined result. However, considering 
that many aggressive tax planning techniques—such as the treaty shopping, 
hybrid mismatches, and secrecy discussed above—are mostly offered by 
the intermediate countries themselves, it is difficult to justify their primary 
taxing power in multinational fund investment. 
This Article offers a new alternative proposal (the Proposal) for non-
CIV funds. Under the Proposal, as long as a fund distributes 100% of its 
income to its investors, it shall qualify for international pass-through taxation. 
The source country and residence country shall determine whether the fund 
is qualified for such international pass-through taxation. These countries
shall each collect tax as if the investment was made directly from the residence 
country to the source country. Multinational indirect investors will achieve
tax-neutral consequences, just as if they had invested directly. Intermediate 
countries are required to cooperate in the process. The end result of the
Proposal would be the same as that of the OECD’s approach, but the Proposal
serves as a more effective alternative because it grants the primary right 
to tax to source and residence countries that are entitled to the tax, rather
than the countries interposed between them.  In that regard, the Proposal for 
29. See OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28, at 10. 
30. This is called a “Global Streamed Fund” regime. Id.; see infra notes 225–32 
and accompanying text. 
31. See infra Section IV.C.
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pass-through taxation is a multilateral approach that looks through intermediate
countries—an approach not available in the traditional model built upon 
bilateral tax treaties.
To further illustrate the feasibility of the Proposal, this Article describes 
how the Proposal will be implemented with respect to PEFs. PEFs, which
are essentially privately held partnerships, are a representative example of 
the non-CIV investment vehicle.32 Because PEFs often involve multiple
layers of pass-through entities and corporate-type special purpose vehicles 
spread across multiple jurisdictions, they are less transparent to the public 
than FDI and CIVs, and the information is less available even to the domestic
regulatory agencies because reporting requirements have been limited.33 
However, if the administrative authorities tried to obtain information on
the individual investors behind the investment vehicles, it would be easier
to do so for PEFs than for CIVs. This is because PEFs tend to have only 
a handful of high-profile investors, who rarely change during the lifetime 
of a fund,34 “while CIVs generally have many more, including private retail
investors.”35  Information on such investors are now more available to 
governments through public and private databases as well as the newly
enhanced exchange of tax information system.36 
Considering that a prerequisite to implementing pass-through taxation 
is for the relevant tax authority to look through the fund vehicle and obtain 
the information of the investors behind the vehicle, PEFs with a small and 
manageable number of investors relative to CIVs allow for pass-through 
taxation because of the possibility of collecting the relevant information
for source and residence countries. Thus, it may make sense to begin with 
PEFs—perhaps as “low-hanging fruit”—in engineering pass-through taxation 
in international tax. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II examines tax neutrality between
direct and indirect investments in a domestic tax system.  It also explains 
why tax neutrality should be anormative goal for fund investment internationally. 
Part III analyzes the challenges in taxing multinational fund investments 
32. See Kim, supra note 8, at 427–29. 
33. See Sanchirico, supra note 2, at 264–65. However, the Dodd-Frank Act now 
imposes disclosure requirement on the managers of hedge funds, private equity funds, and 
venture capital funds.  See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of U.S. Code); ELI TALMOR & FLORIN VASVARI, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE EQUITY 17 (2011). 
34. Interest in PEFs is “an intrinsically illiquid asset class” so that partners in PEFs
rarely change during the lifetime of PEFs.  See TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 33, at 187.  
Although the recent development of the secondary market for trading interests in PEFs to 
provide liquidity will give greater complexity, it is still true that the change in partners is 
relatively less common in PEFs than in CIVs. See id. 
35. Kim, supra note 8, at 447. 
36. See infra Section V.A. 
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and shows how and why tax neutrality fails for multinational fund investments 
using three paradigm cases. Part IV reviews the efforts to develop a general 
rule of pass-through taxation. It also develops the Proposal for non-CIV 
funds. Part V offers the prospect of implementing the Proposal in the case
of PEFs. It presents empirical data on the number of investors in PEFs.  
Finally, Part VI concludes with suggestions for the future.  
II. TAX NEUTRALITY FOR FUND INVESTMENTS
This Part examines what tax neutrality between direct and indirect investment 
means and why it should be a normative goal for taxing both domestic and 
multinational fund investments. To help understand the rules for fund
investment, this Article introduces three paradigm cases.
A. Outline of the Paradigm Cases
Paradigm Case 1.1 is the case of purely pooling capital from multiple 
investors via a “pass-through entity,” such as a partnership, limited partnership, 
or in some cases, a limited liability company (LLC). Pass-through entities 
of this kind are typically not taxable entities.37
Paradigm Case 1.2 involves the use of a special purpose company (SPC)
or “holding company” as an investment vehicle. Such a company does not 
have substance but is established for the special purpose of that particular
investment, such as acquiring a target company.38 An SPC is, in principle,
a taxable entity as a corporation, subject to comprehensive entity-level
taxation. However, if certain requirements with respect to purpose, operation, 
or activities are met, an SPC’s income is fully exempt. That is, it is treated
as a conduit and disregarded for tax purposes.
Paradigm Case 1.3 is a combination of cases 1.1 and 1.2. Here, the pass- 
through vehicle is established to pool the capital from multiple investors, 
and such a vehicle establishes a holding company for specific investment 
purposes.
In all three cases, the target company is the only entity that is generating   
of the target company relating to its business but on the investment by,
and distribution to the investors via, investment vehicles. This Article will 
analyze such tax consequences, implications, and the problems of each 
37. See RICHARD M. LIPTON ET AL., PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 5 (2d ed. 2008).
38. ROLF EICKE, REPATRIATION OF US PROFITS FROM EUROPE: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES,
STRUCTURES 37 (2009). 
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Figure 4 Paradigm Case 1.2 
Paradigm Case under the three jurisdictional models—single, bilateral
and multinational—step by step.      
,
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B. Domestic Tax Rules 
Domestic tax policy with respect to fund investments is designed to 
eliminate double taxation so as to accomplish tax neutrality between direct 
investment and indirect investment. 
1. Paradigm Case 1.1: Pass-Through Vehicle 
Paradigm Case 1.1 involves a pass-through entity, typically a partnership, 
to pool capital from multiple investors. In the United States, as a general rule, 
the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) does not view a partnership as a separate
taxable entity but treats it as a pass-through entity in which its owners— 
partners—not the partnership itself, are subject to tax.39 Of course, it is possible
to tax partnerships themselves, and some foreign countries currently tax 
partnerships as taxable business entities.40 However, unless every business
entity of any size or any formation is subject to entity-level taxation, there 
will always be certain types of business entities that are “effectively taxed 
to their owners directly and not to the entity itself.”41 Paradigm Case 1.1 deals
with business entities of this kind, whether called partnerships or something
else.
The effect of the pass-through regime can be justified from the efficiency
perspective insofar as it eliminates double taxation in the indirect investment 
structure—taxing both the entity and the investor—and thus accomplishes 
neutrality between direct investment, in which the investors invest in the target
directly, and indirect investment, in which the investors invest in the target 
through intermediary business entities.42 
39. LIPTON ET AL., supra note 37, at 5. 
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. In domestic tax literature, it is explained as minimizing “the role of taxes on the 
choice of the form [of entities].”  STEPHEN SCHWARZ & DANIEL J. LATHROPE, FUNDAMENTALS 
OF CORPORATE TAXATION 5 (9th ed. 2016).  With no double taxation, investing through 
a pass-through entity was preferred to a taxable corporation before the TCJA.  However, 
the TCJA reduced the statutory corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%; thus, investing 
through a taxable corporation can sometimes be better than investing directly, at least 
domestically, especially if distributions from a taxable corporation will be deferred for a 
period of years.  Franklin, supra note 16.  In other words, the corporate tax rate cut reduces the 
tax burden at the entity level, the deferral in effect halts the tax burden at the investor level, 
and the overall effective tax rate would be 21%.  However, the pass-through investment is 
usually required to promptly distribute funds to investors, and, thus, there will be 
immediate taxation at the investor level.  Assuming that an investor is an individual and the 
top marginal tax rate for an individual is 37%, the overall effective tax rate would be 37%.  
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2. Paradigm Case 1.2: Holding Company 
Paradigm Case 1.2 involves an SPC. An SPC is, in principle, a taxable
entity as a corporation, such that investments through an SPC entail double 
taxation—once at the entity level, and once at the shareholder level. If certain 
requirements are met, however, the SPC is treated as a conduit and 
disregarded for tax purposes.43 
Even where the SPC is disregarded for tax purposes, it is still bankruptcy-
remote and respected as a separate entity from investors for corporate law 
purposes, unless the corporate shell is denied by corporate law principles 
such as piercing the corporate veil.44  Hence, the difference between Paradigm 
Cases 1.1 and 1.2 is that the investment vehicle for the former case is transparent 
for both tax and corporate law purposes, while the vehicle for the latter 
case is usually transparent for tax purposes but not transparent for corporate 
law purposes. 
3. Paradigm Case 1.3: Combined Structure 
Paradigm Case 1.3 combines Paradigm Cases 1.1 and 1.2.  For fund 
investment, such as investment via CIVs or non-CIVs, Paradigm Case 1.3
is the most common structure. Here, the pass-through vehicle is established 
to pool the capital from multiple investors. This vehicle then establishes 
a holding company by which the investment, such as acquiring a target
company, is made.  The investment proceeds generated by the target company
will flow through the holding company and the pass-through entity until 
they reach investors.
The key tax consideration here is to keep entity-level tax away.  This
is due to the indirect investment technique being derived from partnership
Therefore, in today’s rate environment, investing through an entity treated as a corporation 
might actually be more favorable than investing directly. Nonetheless, this explanation 
on comparing taxable corporations and pass-through entities for tax purposes does not uphold in
the multi-jurisdictional analysis, especially when the intermediary entity is usually required 
to promptly distribute funds. See id. Thus, Section II.B. intends to offer a general explanation 
of domestic tax rules for fund investments as a groundwork before discussing international
taxation, rather than addressing a transitional phenomenon caused by the tax rate change in
the TCJA. 
43. See generally Brad A. Birmingham & James M. Bandoblu, Jr., Disregarded Entities: 
To Be or Not to Be?, 11 BUS. ENTITIES 12 (2009). One of the most popular requirements 
is the minimum distribution to the shareholders or investors, such as distributing more than 
90% of proceeds to shareholders every year. Eric M. Zolt, Taxation of Investment Funds, 
in 2 TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING ch. 22, at 5 n.14 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1998). The 
rationale behind the policy to acknowledge conduits as a disregarded entity in the investment 
structure is to reduce the economic distortion. Id.
44. See William H. Widen, Corporate Form and Substantive Consolidation, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. Rev. 237, 268–70 (2007). 
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investment with the aim of taking advantage of pooling capital while 
eliminating double taxation.  The pass-through entity is not subject to tax 
from the beginning.  As long as the SPC qualifies as a conduit that is not subject 
to tax, the goal of eliminating entity-level taxation can be achieved. 
In sum, domestic tax policy with respect to pass-through entities or SPCs 
is designed to eliminate entity-level taxation, accomplishing tax neutrality 
between direct investment and indirect investment. An important rationale is
that it is not necessary to impose double taxation in such an investment
structure because its commercial function and character are different from 
those of the corporate regime, and that it is nonetheless beneficial to allow 
a fiscally transparent entity for the purpose of pooling capital as a means
to raise funds on a large scale.45 
C. Tax Neutrality and International Fund Investments 
Now let us expand the picture into international settings and discuss
what would be a proper international tax policy for fund investments.
Because examining how domestic tax law is designed for three Paradigm
Cases offers insight into the normative framework for international tax 
policy, this Article argues that international tax policy should also seek to
achieve tax neutrality between direct investment and indirect investment. 
Tax neutrality generally means the absence of tax-related distortion affecting 
decision-making between different types of investment, such as FDI and 
foreign indirect investment.46 Thus, if the features of international investment 
funds are functionally equivalent to the investments through a partnership
or a pass-through entity, eliminating entity-level taxation of investment funds
even in the international setting and taxing investors only would be a proper 
policy for foreign indirect investment.47 The OECD also endorses the tax 
neutrality between direct and indirect investment in the international setting.48 
Domestic tax rules offer a way to achieve the goal of tax neutrality
by eliminating entity-level taxation for indirect investments through pass-
through tax regime or partnership tax.49 The goal of tax neutrality is also being
45. See, e.g., LIPTON ET AL., supra note 37, at 7.
46. OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at 3–4. 
47. See generally OECD, POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT USER’S TOOLKIT:
CHAPTER 5. TAX POLICY (2013), http://www.oecd.org/investment/toolkit/policyareas/41890309.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AU2Q-3SKZ] [hereinafter OECD, POLICY FRAMEWORK].
48. OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-10 to -11, R(24)-17 to -19. 
49. OECD, Commentaries on Articles of the Model Tax Convention, in MODEL TAX 
CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 2010, supra note 25, at C(1), C(1)-5 [hereinafter
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achieved in relatively simple cross-border transactions if only two jurisdictions 
are involved. As shown in Part III, however, the goal is not achieved 
in multinational settings where more than two countries are involved. For
those cases, this Article’s proposed approach will help achieve the tax  
neutrality of multinational fund investments by way of overcoming the opacity
of the intermediary in the investment structure and finding the ultimate
investors in the residence country.
III. FAILED TAX NEUTRALITY FOR MULTINATIONAL FUND 
INVESTMENTS 
This Part examines the challenges that the current international tax regime
faces in taxing fund investments. Using three paradigm cases, this Part also
examines how and why tax neutrality fails for multinational fund investments. 
A. Overview of Inadequate Rules and Harmful Practices 
Most observers would likely agree that a tax system should provide a 
valid set of guidelines to distinguish legitimate tax planning from tax avoidance 
and to prevent the latter, which harms tax efficiency and equity.50 However,
too often a gray area exists in which aggressive tax planning can occur. Most 
of the time, aggressive tax planning results from the fact that the law is not
simple, clear, and coherent, or because the law does not always keep pace
with changes in the world.51 
The international tax regime, which is embodied in the network of tax
treaties and the domestic international tax law of major trading countries,52 
has been notorious for not providing such a guideline for a number of reasons.
OECD, Commentaries on Model 2010] (explaining that the goal of a domestic tax system 
dealing with indirect investment is “to provide tax neutrality between direct investments
and investments through a [vehicle],” so the investment vehicles for such indirect investment
are usually a pass-through entity, which is not subject to entity level taxation).
50. Two widely accepted criteria for a good tax system are efficiency and equity.
Some tax scholars consider simplicity as an additional criterion for a good tax system, and
provide three criteria: efficiency, equity, and simplicity. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH
H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 27–30 (7th ed. 2013). 
51. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING INDICATORS FINAL 
REPORT 22–23 (2017), https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Study-on-ATP-
indicators.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4QC-P374] (providing evidence of the aggressive tax planning
structures in Europe). 
52. There is a debate on whether an international tax regime even exists. See REUVEN
S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
TAX REGIME 1 (2007).  In this regard, I assume for my purposes that there is an international 
tax regime in the form of the network of tax treaties and domestic international tax law of 
various countries. 
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First, this body of law has a relatively short history of full-fledged development 
compared to the long and rich history of domestic tax law. The modern
international tax rules have their roots in model bilateral income tax treaties 
drafted in the early twentieth century under the auspices of the League of
Nations.53 Despite the short history, these model treaties have served as 
the foundation for more than 2,000 bilateral income tax treaties in force
throughout the world.54 The main purposes of such model treaties are to
allocate the tax jurisdictions among countries and to eliminate potential 
double taxation on the same income by the source country and the residence
country.55 But these treaties only provide the rough principle of allocation,
under which business income is primarily taxed by the source country and
portfolio income by the residence country.56 
Second, notwithstanding its short history, the principles and concepts of 
the international tax regime have not been updated adequately to keep pace 
with rapid changes.57 The formative period of international tax principles 
and concepts was 1918–28.58  Clearly, in that era, there was no e-commerce, 
no financial derivatives, far less mobility of capital across borders, far less 
developed emergence of tax havens, and less sophisticated cross-border 
investment structures. 
One reason for this delay in reforming the international tax regime lies 
in the fact that the primary source of law is bilateral income tax treaties,
which can be much harder to amend than domestic tax laws.59 Moreover,
it is difficult to reach a global consensus on the direction nations wish to 
advance. For instance, developed countries and developing countries have 
different interests. Nearly every country, meanwhile, has different ideas 
about how international tax law should be revised. Furthermore, although
one country may decide to revise its own international tax law and treaties 
53. See id. at 182. 
54. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. 
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1023 (1997); see also Graetz, supra note 12, 
at 262. 
55. Double taxation here refers to the exercise of tax jurisdiction twice—one by the 
source country and the other by the residence country.  See supra note 18.  This is different 
from double taxation that occurs due to the entity level taxation, such corporate tax—one 
at the entity level and the other at the investor level.  See OECD, POLICY FRAMEWORK, supra 
note 47, at 23, 34. 
56. Graetz, supra note 12, at 262. 
57. See id. at 262–63. 
58. Id. at 315–16. 
59. See id. at 261–62. 
725
POST CHRISTINE KIM PAGES2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/15/2019 10:18 AM        
 
 
   
 




     
  
     
    
       
    
  
    
   
 
 





    
  
 
      
  
      
   
   
   
 




in its own way, it cannot deviate too much from the global standard due to 
a concern for reciprocity.60 
The above is a basic picture of the challenges under the traditional 
international tax regime. The next question is how such challenges are
amplified in the era of a globalized economy with more sophisticated investment 
techniques, particularly in the context of multinational fund investments. 
1. Over-Taxation 
The current international tax regime built upon bilateral tax treaties may 
result in over-taxation for investors in multinational fund investments. This 
over-taxation occurs—relative to direct investment—essentially because
investors may not claim treaty benefits mitigating double taxation by source 
country and residence country, which would normally be available through 
direct investment.61 The opacity of fund vehicles in intermediate countries
makes it difficult to look-through the vehicles and see investors in residence 
countries as income is distributed from the source country.
A possible solution for such over-taxation might be to allow treaty benefits
to investors and every fund vehicle in intermediate countries. However, 
this solution is difficult to attain for the following reasons.
First, tax treaties, which provide the most important rules for taxing cross- 
border transactions, are by nature bilateral.62 These treaties are limited in 
their ability to resolve the frequent cases that involve more than two 
jurisdictions. In these cases, the investors, investment, and investment vehicles
are each located in three or more different countries. Pass-through vehicles 
are mainly domiciled in countries that do not have an extensive tax treaty
network.63 Such non-treaty countries then cut the chain of bilateral tax
treaties from investors in the residence country through the investment in
the source country. This omission makes it difficult for investors to claim 
treaty benefits. Without a tax treaty, investors must resort to the domestic
tax law of each country involved, but, ironically, domestic tax law largely
parallels tax treaties, and thus does not help resolve these complicated cases. 
Second, even if an intermediate country has a tax treaty with a source
country or residence country, it is not entirely clear whether a multinational 
fund vehicle is entitled to treaty benefits under the current international 
60. See id. at 300. An important function of international tax law is to eliminate
international double taxation, which can effectively be eliminated by reciprocally respected 
international tax principles.  See id.  However, if one country acts arbitrarily, it breaks the 
balance of reciprocity and comity, causing antagonism from the global community, with 
possible retaliation in various ways.  See id. 
61. Warren, supra note 18, at 137. 
62. See id. 132–34. 
63. See infra Section III.C.1. 
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tax regime.64 Despite the increasing volume of cross-border investments
through multinational funds, existing bilateral tax treaties, as well as the 
OECD’s Model Convention with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital
(OECD Model), do not contain specific provisions relating to whether such 
fund vehicles are entitled to treaty benefits.65 Thus, the traditional rule simply 
relies on general principles or theories of international tax law. Under these
traditional principles, a fund should be: (1) a person, (2) a resident of a country
which has a tax treaty with the source country, and (3) the beneficial owner
of the income it receives.66 However, in many cases, the treaty entitlement of a
fund vehicle would be challenged with respect to the residence requirement 
and the beneficial ownership requirements. 
Third, the existing rule only provides for binary all-or-nothing application
of the treaty to the fund vehicles.67 In other words, under the current system,
an entity receives either: (1) full treaty benefits, if it meets all requirements
for treaty benefits, or (2) no treaty benefits, if it fails to meet even one 
requirement.68 Therefore, if a fund vehicle is not entitled to treaty benefits, 
the traditional rule merely creates a cliff by denying the treaty benefits to
investors, who otherwise would have been entitled to treaty benefits, had 
they received the income directly from the source country.69 As a result, 
investors in the funds, or indirect investors, in other words, are placed in
a worse position than they would be in the case of direct investment. This 
does not serve the goal of tax neutrality between direct investment and indirect 
investment.70 
In short, the traditional international tax rules do not provide sufficient
guidance to determine coherent tax consequences once treaty benefits have 
been denied to multinational funds. In contrast, domestic tax law, when 
it challenges the tax consequences of original transactions by applying anti- 
avoidance rules, has mechanisms to determine the adjusted tax consequences 
64. Treaty benefits typically refer that certain types of income, such as dividends, interest,
rentals, royalties, pensions, and annuities, received by a resident of a contracting state may 
be exempt from tax of the other contracting state or may be subject to a reduced rate of tax 
of the other contracting state.  See, e.g., OECD, POLICY FRAMEWORK, supra note 47, at 34. 
65. See generally OECD, Model Convention, in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME
AND ON CAPITAL 2010, supra note 25, at M-3 [hereinafter OECD Model 2010]. 
66. OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-2.
67. See id. at R(24)-19. 
68. Id.
69. Id. 
70. This problem also applies to FPI using CIVs. See OECD, Commentaries on Model 
2010, supra note 49, para. 6.8, at C(1)-5. 
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by recasting the transaction so as to systematically conform to the integrated
tax system.71 As a result, the lack of such rules that adjust tax consequences
after a denial of tax benefits remains a huge defect of the international tax
regime.
2. Under-Taxation 
To avoid the over-taxation described above, multinational funds have 
developed many tax-planning techniques to reduce tax liability in relevant 
countries. This Subsection discusses the potential under-taxation problem 
arising from treaty shopping and hybrid mismatch. 
First, taxpayers may achieve under-taxation in a source country through 
treaty shopping.72 Treaty shopping generally refers to a situation where 
taxpayers take advantage of more favorable tax treaties between a source 
country and certain jurisdictions other than their residence country.73 In most
multinational fund investment structures, the intermediate country where 
holding companies are located offers such an opportunity.74 Here, treaty 
benefits mean reduced withholding tax rates under a tax treaty so taxpayers
may reduce tax liability in source country by shopping favorable treaties.75 
The reduced tax liability in the source country may result in an outcome better 
than the tax-neutral benchmark, especially because many investors in
multinational funds are tax-exempt organizations in the residence country; 
the structure of these organizations is irrelevant to the tax liability in the 
residence country.76 Even if an investor is not exempted from tax in the
residence country, such reduced taxation in the source country may result
in overall under-taxation because the investor may not claim full foreign 
tax credit in the residence country.77 
Second, taxpayers may achieve under-taxation in residence country via
hybrid mismatches—using a hybrid instrument or entity that produces a 
71. See OECD, POLICY FRAMEWORK, supra note 47, at 13–14, 19–21, 26. The result 
of such adjustment is most likely unfavorable to the taxpayers, but there are cases that the 
outcome is similar to, or even more favorable than, the original transaction.  Of course, the latter 
seldom happens because such possibility that challenging the original tax position will lead 
to more favorable tax consequences to the taxpayer would function as a negative factor 
in deciding whether the original transaction would be a tax avoidance or not. 
72. See Kenneth A. Grady, Comment, Income Tax Treaty Shopping: An Overview
of Prevention Techniques, 5 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 626, 627–28 (1983). 
73. Id. at 627. 
74. Wells & Lowell, supra note 23, at 543–44. 
75. Grady, supra note 72, at 627–28. 
76. Although tax-exempt organizations are exempted from tax in the residence
country, they are subject to tax in the source country, including withholding tax in tax treaties. 
See Tax Treaties, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-
taxpayers/tax-treaties [https://perma.cc/9XDF-PX22] (last updated Dec. 18, 2018). 
77. See infra Section III.C.3, Part VII. 
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mismatch in tax treatment in different countries.78 The primary purpose 
of the hybrid mismatch is to eliminate entity-level taxation in intermediate 
countries.79 Eliminating entity-level taxation itself may not be considered 
harmful because it makes the tax consequences in intermediate countries 
equivalent to the tax-neutral benchmark. However, taxpayers may further 
achieve under-taxation in the residence country through hybrid mismatch.
For example, a hybrid instrument may convert the ordinary income in the 
source or intermediate country into dividends or capital gains in the residence
country. Because many countries provide preferential tax rates to dividends 
or capital gains, such conversion may reduce tax liability in the residence 
country.80 
Interestingly, hybrid mismatch and the resulting low taxes in intermediate
countries make it difficult for some source countries to respect the treaty 
shopping structure.81 As discussed in Sections B and C, whether an entity
is liable to pay substantial tax in its residence country is a crucial factor to 
entitle treaty benefits.  If a fund vehicle pays substantial tax to the intermediate 
country, the source country is more likely to respect the tax treaty with that
country even if it is treaty shopping. Due to the minimal tax in intermediate
country, however, several source countries challenge the treaty benefits in
this case and recast the transaction as a non-treaty case. That puts much
worse tax consequences on investors than a tax-neutral benchmark, as in 
the over-taxation case. Appendix A briefly shows this result in hypothetical 
problems. 
International tax rules for multinational fund investments should provide
rules not only to analyze entities in each layer separately but also to analyze 
the ultimate investors. Such rules also should address the treaty benefit 
analysis on the overall investment structure spanning the multiple jurisdictions. 
However, the existing regime does not provide clear guidance on these issues, 
especially about how to deal with the investors behind an investment vehicle
78. See supra notes 21, 24.
79. See infra Section III.C.2. 
80. Furthermore, if the taxpayer is a tax-exempt organization, the hybrid instrument 
may convert unrelated taxable business income into passive investment income that is exempted 
from taxation for such organization, resulting in the under-taxation in the residence country.  
See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE TREATMENT 
OF BUSINESS DEBT 66, 77, 85 (2001). 
81. See, e.g., Sebastian Beer, Ruud A. de Mooij & Li Liu, International Corporate 
Tax Avoidance: A Review of the Channels, Magnitudes, and Blind Spots 28 (Int’l Monetary 
Fund, Working Paper No., 2018) (explaining that MNEs exploit mismatches in national tax 
rules, allowing them to treaty shop in countries with more favorable tax rates). 
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which is found not to be entitled to treaty benefits.  This lack of guidance 
puts investors at a worse level than the tax-neutral benchmark; it harms 
the tax neutrality of the indirect investment. 
The problem becomes more puzzling if there are a number of intermediaries 
in multiple jurisdictions, and it becomes even more complicated when some
of the investors are funds or institutional investors rather than individuals, 
making it more challenging to determine the ultimate investors.
Recognizing the lack of rules and flaws in cross-border indirect investment 
in multinational situation, the OECD82 and the International Fiscal Association 
(IFA)83 have released several reports on the matter. Two such reports—
the OECD Partnership Report and the CIV Report—will be discussed in
detail in Part IV. The essence of their suggestions is that many investment 
vehicles or entities themselves will be entitled to treaty benefits, but even 
if the entities are not so qualified, investors in such entities should be able 
to claim benefits. 
The policy goal of such reports is to achieve tax neutrality between direct
investment and indirect investment in international transactions. However, 
the OECD and IFA reports limited the scope of their suggestions to CIVs,84 
and they did not consider “issues of treaty entitlement with respect to investments 
through private equity funds, hedge funds or trusts or other entities” until the 
OECD released a discussion draft in 2017 regarding those funds excluded 
in the CIV Report, called non-CIVs.85 
Such explicit exclusion of non-CIVs provoked me to embark on this
Article. The current international tax regime, based on bilateral solutions, 
82. For OECD’s discussion, see generally OECD, FIRST MEETING OF THE INFORMAL 
CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE TAXATION OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES (2007); 
OECD, REPORT OF THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE TAXATION OF COLLECTIVE 
INVESTMENT VEHICLES AND PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR CROSS-BORDER INVESTORS 
ON THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS WITH RESPECT TO THE INCOME OF COLLECTIVE 
INVESTMENT VEHICLES (2009); OECD, TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT: 
MUTUAL FUNDS AND POSSIBLE TAX DISTORTIONS (1999); OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 
26. 
83. For IFA’s discussion, see generally 73 INT’L FISCAL ASS’N, STUDIES ONINTERNATIONAL
FISCAL LAW:51STCONGRESSOFTHEINTERNATIONALFISCAL ASSOCIATION,NEWDELHI1997 (1997).
84. Collective Investment Vehicles in the literatures of the OECD are an equivalent 
concept to mutual fund or “regulated investment companies” (RIC) under the Internal Revenue 
Code. See I.R.C. § 851(f)(1) (2012); OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-3. 
85. OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-4; see supra note 28. The OECD 
CIV Report does not explain why it excludes non-CIV funds from its scope.  However, in 
a subsequent document, the OECD explains that the conclusion in the CIV report cannot 
apply to the “policy considerations relevant to the treaty entitlement of non-CIV funds.”  
OECD, PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, 
ACTION 6–2015 FINAL REPORT, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT 
15 (2015).  This implies that the nature of non-CIV funds are distinguished from that of 
CIV funds. See generally Kim, supra note 8. 
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lacks the proper rules and policy to deal with non-CIVs as well. In 2017, 
the OECD released discussion drafts on non-CIV funds as part of its BEPS
Project, but the scope remains limited to treaty entitlement.86 In treaty 
shopping, investors in non-CIVs often structure transactions aggressively 
to exploit the limits of bilateral solutions.  They also often achieve low taxation 
compared to the hypothetical tax liability if they had invested directly.  This 
behavior poses a major problem relating to non-CIV fund investments.  
However, the problems indeed go beyond treaty shopping.  The bilateral 
approach also allows source countries to challenge the transactions, in which 
case the tax burdens increase exponentially, because the countries challenging 
the transactions may not consider multinational dimensions of their tax 
policy.  Neither of these cases is desirable, because both diverge from 
tax neutrality between direct investment and indirect investment.  Furthermore, 
hybrid mismatch and tax secrecy relating to intermediary jurisdictions play 
an important role to harm tax neutrality.  Section B discusses the problems 
of current bilateral approaches that occur when participants apply bilateral 
tax treaties to multinational fund investment.  More detailed analysis on 
the inadequacy of current rules for non-CIVs takes place in Section C. 
B. Application of Bilateral Tax Treaties to Fund Investment 
This Section analyzes how the international tax regime—again, which
developed based on bilateral solutions—applies to globalized investment
funds. In the bilateral jurisdictional frame, two countries are involved: the 
source country and the residence country. The international tax consequences 
are determined basically under the domestic tax laws of the two countries, 
unless an applicable tax treaty modifies the tax result.87 When a domestic
tax code provision conflicts with the applicable tax treaty, many countries 
solve such conflicts by considering the treaty a higher source of law than 
a statute.88 
86. See generally OECD, DISCUSSION NON-CIV EXAMPLES, supra note 28. 
87. The Internal Revenue Code provisions “shall be applied to any taxpayer with due 
regard to any treaty obligation of the United States which applies to such taxpayer.”  I.R.C. 
§ 894(a)(1). 
88. See id. § 7852(d)(1). However, under the U.S. Constitution, “U.S. treaties and 
federal statues have equal status as the supreme law of the land and, thus, whenever there 
is a conflict between the two, the later in time prevails.”  GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra 
note 18, ¶ 1295, at 73 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).  Therefore, there are many cases 
where newly enacted legislation that is inconsistent with the existing tax treaty provision will 
prevail, which is called the “treaty override.”  See id.  However, in many instances new legislation 
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Therefore, in the bilateral jurisdictions frame, it is imperative to determine 
whether a tax treaty is applicable to the transaction at issue.  With respect
to the treaty application, the key question is whether the investment funds
in question are entitled to the treaty benefits. 
Existing bilateral tax treaties as well as the OECD Model do not contain 
specific provisions relating to whether fund vehicles are entitled to treaty 
benefits. Thus, the traditional rule simply relies on general principles 
of international tax law, by which an investment fund should be (1) a person,
(2) a resident of a country which has a tax treaty with the source country, 
and (3) the beneficial owner of the income it receives.89 
Although there are three prongs, the existing tests mainly focus on the 
second prong—whether the entity pays taxes to the alleged residence country.
For example, with respect to the issue of residency, Article 4(1) of the OECD 
Model defines the resident of a contracting state as “any person who, under
the laws of that state, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, 
place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature.”90  Furthermore,
in making a determination regarding beneficial ownership, the Commentaries 
on the Articles of the OECD Model provide that if the recipient of the income
is liable to pay taxes to the residence country, there remains a potential
risk of double taxation, so the recipient should be treated as the beneficial
owner of such income. In contrast, if the recipient is not liable for taxes,
there is no potential double taxation and no need to see the recipient as the
beneficial owner of such income.91 
As such, both residency and beneficial ownership tests rely on whether 
the entity pays taxes in the alleged residence country. With regard to such 
a single criterion as whether or not a person has tax liability, residency is 
determined by the residence country. By contrast, beneficial ownership is
determined by the source country. As a result, the source country and the 
residence country interpret or apply a treaty to the fund in different ways.
Furthermore, the existing rules do not answer the question of how to treat 
an investment vehicle, which is in principle subject to taxation but remains
exempt for the purpose of domestic tax policy.
is not intended to override a treaty, and Congress makes it clear that the new tax provisions 
should be interpreted harmoniously with existing tax treaties. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 (AM. LAW INS. 1987).
89. OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-2.
90. OECD, ARTICLES OF THE MODEL CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME
AND ON CAPITAL art. 4, § 1 (2003) (emphasis added), https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/1914467.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7F2C-QSJ8].
91. Even though the immediate recipient of the income qualifies as a resident, “no
potential double taxation arises as a consequence of that status since the recipient is not treated 
as the owner of the income for tax purposes in the State of residence.”  OECD, Commentaries 
on Model 2010, supra note 49, para. 12.1, at C(10)-3. 
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Considering that the OECD has released reports dealing with CIVs and 
non-CIVs separately, I will review the traditional rule for these two types 
of vehicles separately as well. 
1. Existing Rule for CIVs 
The legal forms of CIVs, such as mutual funds, vary from country to country.
Most of them can be classified as: (1) a corporation or company, (2) a 
trust, or (3) a partnership.92 Sometimes, the determination of each CIV’s
legal form based on the entity classification theory is the preliminary issue 
in the application of tax treaties. Once the entity is classified, however, 
the tax treatment of such CIVs differs depending on the tax laws93 and treaties
of countries. The absence of a unified treatment of CIVs gives rise to undesirable 
situations, including double taxation or double non-taxation in the international 
regime.
The OECD and IFA have made efforts to cope with these problems by
allowing treaty benefits to CIVs, but their existing studies reveal limits on
resolving the fundamental problems. 
First, it is not clear whether every type of CIV can be regarded as a person. 
According to the definition of a “person” in the OECD Model,94 a CIV
taking the form of a company would satisfy the requirement of a legal person.95 
However, it remains unclear whether trusts and partnerships would fall 
under this definition.96 
92. For example, the United Kingdom has Authorized Unit Trust as a trust-type entity 
and Open-Ended Investment Company as a corporate-type entity.  António Calisto Pato, 
Cross-Border Direct Tax Issues of Investment Funds from the Perspective of European Law 8 
(Aug. 15, 2007) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Leiden) (on file with University of 
Leiden).  The U.S. law allows CIVs to take any form among corporations, business trusts, or 
limited partnerships.  In addition, Unit Trust as a close-ended investment fund can take the 
form of a trust.  See TOMI VIITALA, TAXATION OF INVESTMENT FUNDS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 35 (2005); Pato, supra, at 8. 
93. In many cases, the issue is affected by the source country’s concept of beneficial 
ownership, which is often not defined by code.  See Pato, supra note 92, at 11. 
94. Because Article 3, section 1(a) of the OECD Model defines a person  as “an  
individual, a company and any other body of persons,” and the term “company” is further 
defined in section 1(b) as “any body corporate or any entity that is treated as a body corporate 
for tax purposes,” a CIV which takes the form of a company would satisfy the requirement 
of a person.  OECD Model 2010, supra note 65, art. 3, § 1(a)–(b), at M-9. 
95. Lynn J. Ed & Paul J.M. Bongaarts, General Report, in STUDIES ON INTERNATIONAL 
FISCAL LAW: 51ST CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL FISCAL ASSOCIATION, NEW DELHI 
1997, supra note 83, at 21, 43. 
96. VIITALA, supra note 92, at 81. 
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Second, according to the definition of a resident in the OECD Model,97 
a CIV that takes the form of a pass-through entity would easily be excluded 
from the definition of a “resident” because it is not liable for taxes in the 
residence country.98  By contrast, if a CIV is in principle liable for taxes but
the country where it is established does not in effect impose tax, the OECD
suggests treating such CIV as a resident of that country “because the CIV
is subject to comprehensive taxation in that State.”99 However, the OECD
further notes that some contracting states may not treat such CIVs as residents 
of that country for treaty purposes.100 
To put the OECD position in terms more familiar from the paradigm cases: 
the OECD suggests that a pass-through vehicle in Paradigm Case 1.1 may 
not be treated as a resident of the country where it is established. It also suggests
that an SPC in Paradigm Case 1.2 would be treated as a resident of such 
country.  However, the treatment of these vehicles is still not certain. 
Third, the definition of beneficial ownership perhaps poses the most difficult 
issue in the application of the treaty.101 The OECD Model requires a CIV
to be a beneficial owner of capital gains102 as well as dividends103 and interest104 
in order to enjoy tax treaty benefit. To satisfy the beneficial ownership
requirement, the managers of the CIV must have discretionary powers to
manage the assets generating such income.105 However, most countries are
reluctant to recognize a fund to be the beneficial owner of such incomes because 
the income is mandatorily distributed or passed through to the investor,
rather than remaining in the CIV pursuant to the managers’ discretion.106 
In sum, the existing studies have tried to award treaty benefits to CIVs, 
but they have not found fundamental solutions under the existing rules.
Moreover, the existing literature merely suggests the principle that there should
be relief to investors when a fund fails to receive treaty benefits. However,
97. Article 4 section 1 of the OECD Model defines the resident of a contacting state 
as “any person who, under the laws of that state, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, 
residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature.”  See OECD Model 
2010, supra note 65, art. 4, § 1.
98. The OECD CIV Report and the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model support 
the same position. Commentaries on Model 2010, supra note 49, para. 6.11, at C(1)-6. 
99. Id. para. 6.12, at C(1)-7.
100. See id. para. 6.13, at C(1)-7; see also Ed & Bongaarts, supra note 95, at 44, 45. 
101. Ed & Bongaarts, supra note 95, at 45.
102. See OECD Model 2010, supra note 65, art. 13. Although the language of Article 13
does not contain this beneficial ownership requirement, it is hard to doubt that such requirement 
is also applicable to capital gains.  See Ed & Bongaarts, supra note 95, at 45.  
103. See OECD Model 2010, supra note 65, art. 10. 
104. See id. art. 11. 
105. OECD, Commentaries on Model 2010, supra note 49, para. 6.14, at C(1)-7.
106. See Ed & Bongaarts, supra note 95, at 45–46. 
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these studies have fallen short of making detailed proposals with respect
to what such relief should involve.
2. Existing Rule for Non-CIVs 
Non-CIVs often involve multiple-tier structures with various legal entities.
Investment portfolios are generally less diversified than CIVs, and they
are also generally subject to less strict regulations.107 These characteristics
distinguish non-CIVs from CIVs. Thus, a separate study is required for the
question of whether PEFs, hedge funds, trust-types, or corporate-types of 
investment vehicles are entitled to treaty benefits and, if so, how to treat 
them.108 
Nevertheless, there remains a shortage of studies on the issue, save for 
the OECD reports on real estate investment trusts (REITs),109 sovereign
wealth funds,110 and the recent discussion draft on non-CIV funds.111  Given
the dearth of relevant research and the lack of rules applicable to non-
CIVs, the existing three-prong test, which requires a fund to be a legal
person, a resident, and the beneficial owner of the foreign income it receives,112 
still needs to be applied. However, under this rule, most non-CIVs are not
entitled to treaty benefits even where some or all their investors would
qualify if the investment were held directly. 
Few existing studies have attempted to discuss this issue. Some have argued 
that the investors, not the fund, should be treated as beneficial owners of
the income,113 and the source country should deny the alleged residency of
the fund.114 Others have proposed to treat a fund as a conduit and disregard 
107. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 8, at 443. 
108. See id. at 447. 
109. See generally OECD, TAX TREATY ISSUES RELATED TO REITS: PUBLIC DISCUSSION 
DRAFT (2007), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/39554788.pdf [https://perma.cc/MSP8-7BLF].
110. See generally OECD, DISCUSSION DRAFT ON THE APPLICATION OF TAX TREATIES TO 
STATE-OWNED ENTITIES, INCLUDING SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (2009), http://www.oecd.org/
ctp/treaties/44080490.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NY8-TFYG]. 
111. See OECD, DISCUSSION NON-CIV EXAMPLES, supra note 28, at 1–2. 
112. OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-2.
113. See, e.g., STEF VAN WEEGHEL, THE IMPROPER USE OF TAX TREATIES: WITH 
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES 91 & n.214. (1998).
114. See OECD, PARTNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 25, at R(15)-9; cf. MICHAEL LANG, 
THE APPLICATION OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION TO PARTNERSHIPS: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT PREPARED BY THE OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS 40–41 
(2000). 
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it under the substance-over-form doctrine of domestic tax law.115 Although
such studies try to overcome the current limitation by using one of the three 
prongs of the existing rules, none of them suggest a coherent and all-
encompassing approach covering all three requirements. 
3. Paradigm Cases in Bilateral Jurisdictions: Country of
Source and Country of Residence 
Despite these flaws, the existing rule generally works if the fund investment 
structure spreads across only two countries—in a bilateral situation—and
tax neutrality between direct investment and indirect investment is accomplished.
This is not a surprising result when one recalls that the existing international 
tax rules and principles were initially developed based on bilateral solutions. 
In our paradigm cases, the border may exist in the following three scenarios:
(1) between the target company and the SPC (Paradigm Case 2.1), (2)
between the SPC and the pass-through vehicle (Paradigm Case 2.2), and
(3) between the pass-through vehicle and the investors (Paradigm Case 2.3).
To simplify the analysis, let us assume there is a tax treaty between Country 
A and Country B, and both countries have a tax system treating a pass-through
entity as a non-taxable entity.
In Paradigm Cases 2.1 and 2.2, it is not certain whether the SPC or the
pass-through entity are entitled to the treaty benefits discussed above.  
However, such a problem is not critical in these two cases. As long as the 
pass-through entity and the SPC are not subject to entity-level taxation in 
domestic tax, all investors behind the investment vehicle are the residents 
of Country B, where the pass-through vehicle has been established.116 As
a result, there remains no further international tax consequences between
the pass-through vehicle and the investors. Therefore, international tax
issues—such as which country has tax jurisdiction for certain income arising 
from the target company; whether the source country could withhold tax 
on such income; how much the tax rate would be; et cetera—would be
resolved by tax treaty.117 In addition, the tax consequences between the
115. See, e.g., Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 925, 925 (1971). Some
commentators see this case as an example of invoking judicial doctrines under domestic 
law, while others see this as a teleological interpretation of tax treaties.  With respect to 
the former argument, see WEEGHEL, supra note 113, at 61–62.  With respect to the latter 
argument, see René Matteotti, Interpretation of Tax Treaties and Domestic General Anti-
Avoidance Rules—A Skeptical Look at the 2003 Update to the OECD Commentary, 33 
INTERTAX 336, 347–49 (2005).
116. See OECD, PARTNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 25, at R(15)-8, -13 to -14.
117. See Andrew P. Morriss & Lotta Moberg, Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the
OECD’s Campaign Against “Harmful Tax Competition,” 4 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 27 (2012). 
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pass-through entity and the investors remain basically domestic matters.118  In
most cases, there exists no additional tax liability or consequence incurred
between them due to the partnership tax regime.  In other words, the tax 
consequences of Paradigm Cases 2.1 and 2.2 are the same as when each 
investor in Country B directly invests in the target company in Country A.  
This means there exists tax neutrality between direct investment and indirect 
investment. 
Moreover, Paradigm Case 2.3 does not involve the treaty entitlement 
problem of investment vehicles. Cash flow from the target company to the 
pass-through vehicle remains a domestic tax matter.119 However, the SPC 
or pass-through vehicle gets either disregarded for tax purposes or labeled
as a non-taxable entity.120 The income received by the SPC and pass-through
vehicle would be attributed to the investors abroad,121 which entails
international tax analysis, such as withholding taxes and treaty application.  
However, because the target company, SPC, and pass-through vehicle are 
in the same jurisdiction, Country A will be considered a source country
regardless of the international tax implications. The tax treaty between
Country A and Country B will thus be applicable.  The tax consequences 
for the investors in Country B are the same as they would be in the case where 
such investors directly invest in the target company in Country A.
In short, the investors in Country B in Paradigm Cases 2.1–2.3 would be
in the same tax position as they would be in the case where such investors 
directly invest in the target company in Country A. That leads to the conclusion 
that there would be neutrality between direct and indirect investment in a 
bilateral structure.
C. Problems in Multinational Structure
In the multinational setting, at least three countries are involved: the country 
where the target company is established (source country), the country where 
investors are located (residence country),122 and the country where the 
investment vehicle is located. To simplify the analysis, I will assume the
income distributed by the target company is in the form of passive income,
such as dividends and capital gains. The analysis here will follow the flow 
118. See Jeffrey M. Colon, Foreign Investors in U.S. Mutual Funds: The Trouble with 
Treaties, 35 VA. TAX REV. 483, 525 (2016). 
119. See id.
120. See Birmingham & Bandoblu, supra note 43, at 18. 
121. See Kim, supra note 8, at 421, 424–25. 
122. Having assumed that there are more than three investors in the paradigm cases,
it is possible that each investor would be in three different countries to diversify the country of 
residence as well.  However, unless it is necessary, the analysis on the investor level will 
be rendered for one jurisdiction among them. 
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of cash, starting from the target in Country A through the pass-through entity
in Country B to the investors in Country C.123 
The first problem in a multinational setting is treaty shopping.  The analysis
of tax structures in a multinational setting is different from that in bilateral
setting in two ways. First, there could be multiple tax treaties potentially
available in the structure, unlike in a bilateral setting. Those tax treaties are
not identical, and they may offer different treaty benefits to investors. As a 
result, investors may be motivated to choose a more favorable tax treaty. Second,
it is neither possible nor practical to assume that each country has an identical
domestic tax law for pass-through taxation. That leads to a possibility that, 
although an investment vehicle is in substance fiscally transparent or a business
conduit, it can be treated as an entity that can claim treaty benefits.  The
combination of these two variations gives rise to the potential for treaty
shopping.
In addition to the treaty shopping, two additional problems loom large
in a multinational setting.  One is the lack of transparency in tax information 
that occurs in small-island tax havens, such as the Cayman Island, Bermuda, 
and the British Virgin Islands (BVI).124  The other problem is the hybrid
mismatch opportunity posed by European intermediary jurisdictions, such
as Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium.125  Traditionally, the three
types of jurisdictions, which offer tax information secrecy, hybrid mismatch 
opportunities, and treaty shopping, are collectively called tax havens because
often a tax haven offers more than one opportunity at the same time.126 
However, the lumped terminology of a tax haven does not help to analyze
each type of problem accurately, considering that the function of the three 
opportunities is different from each other. 
1. Paradigm Case 3.1: Country Where Pass-Through 
Vehicle Is Located 
Ironically, this case may be the least tax-motivated transaction. In the
single jurisdictional frame, Paradigm Case 1.1 is, in effect, tax-motivated
because it uses a vehicle not subject to entity-level taxation. However,
123. I also assume that the residence country of investors has a worldwide tax system
of international taxation, where its resident is subject to tax on all its active income earned 
abroad or domestically. 
124. See Johannesen & Zucman, supra note 24, at 66–68. 
125. See id.
126. See, e.g., id.
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Figure 9 Paradigm Case 3.1 
once a pass-through tax regime is given, the function of this vehicle in
multinational jurisdictions becomes mainly financial.127 In fact, the use
of a pass-through vehicle is desirable to pool investor capital from 
multiple countries to fund a project in a third country.128  This tactic can
be beneficial for shareholder-level diversification and, in some cases, for
achieving threshold levels of capital to fund a project. Furthermore, it
may make sense to locate an intermediary capital-pooling entity in a third 
country unrelated to the shareholders or the location of investment. This 
is not about avoiding residence country taxation so much as avoiding extra 
tax cost.129 
Whatever the financial motive, the tax consequence of Paradigm Case
3.1 is nonetheless very different from that of Paradigm Cases 1.1 in a
single jurisdiction or 2.1 in bilateral jurisdictions. I will analyze Paradigm
Case 3.1 with two scenarios: one with a tax treaty between Countries A 
and B and the other without one.
127. See, e.g., MARPLES, supra note 15, at 3–4 & 3 n.8.
128. See Kim, supra note 8, at 443. 
129. It is intended not to bring on “extra” tax cost relative to aggregate tax cost if each 
investor just held investment in the source country directly without pooling capital. 
740
POST CHRISTINE KIM PAGES2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/15/2019 10:18 AM        
             
     
  
   
        
   
     
 
    
   
   
  
 
      
    
   
         
  
   
   
    
    
 
 






   
  
    
[VOL. 56: 707, 2019] Engineering Pass-Throughs in International Tax 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
a. When There Is a Tax Treaty Between Two Countries 
Let us assume that in Paradigm Case 3.1, an investor is a resident of
Country C, which happens to have a tax treaty with Country A. Country
A also has a tax treaty with Country B, where the pass-through vehicle is
located. Whether the pass-through entity is entitled to treaty benefits under 
the tax treaty between Countries A and B depends on the traditional three-
prong test: whether the pass-through entity is a person, a resident, and a
beneficial owner of the income it receives.130 In a multinational structure,
it is not certain, again, whether the pass-through entity is entitled to treaty 
benefits, particularly under the residency requirement.131 
Assuming that Country B provides a pass-through tax regime for the 
pass-through vehicle, it is more likely that the pass-through entity is not 
entitled to the treaty benefits. The problems arise at this point as to the 
investors. Some source countries treat such a case as a non-treaty case
and apply their domestic tax laws, mostly at a much higher tax rate than 
the usual domestic tax rate or treaty rate.132 Had the investor in Country
C invested in a target company in Country A directly, the investor would have
been entitled to treaty benefits under the tax treaty between Countries A 
and C. However, when an investor invests in the target company through
a pass-through vehicle in Country B, the investor is put in a worse position 
by not being entitled to any treaty benefits because of the bilateral structure
of the treaty arrangements. This result harms the goal of tax neutrality between
direct investment and indirect investment.
However, such a policy—treating this scenario as a non-treaty case— 
has a logical flaw. If the source country denies treaty benefits to the pass-
through entity because it is a fiscally transparent entity, it means that the 
source country does not treat the pass-through entity as a taxpayer on the 
income. In that case, the source country should have determined who the 
real taxpayer is instead of just dropping this case from further tax analysis. 
130. OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-2.
131. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
132. For example, even if treaty benefits will be available to reduce the withholding
tax on payments of U.S. source income made to foreign pass-through or hybrid entities, the 
United States may deny such benefits and tax the income at a full 30% withholding tax unless 
the recipients furnish sufficient documentation to prove that they are the beneficial owner.  
See I.R.C. § 894(c) (2012); 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1441-1, -5 (2017). 
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b. When There Is No Tax Treaty Between Two Countries: 
Small-Island Tax Havens and Tax Secrecy 
In the second scenario of Paradigm Case 3.1, no tax treaty exists between 
Countries A and B. Typically, Country B is a small-island tax haven, such 
as the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, BVI, et cetera. These countries have 
few tax treaties with the rest of the world and have a pass-through tax regime,
exempting foreign-source income from taxation.133 Most importantly, these 
countries provide strong forms of secrecy.134 
If Country A treats the pass-through entity as a fiscally transparent 
entity, the problems are basically similar to those where the pass-through 
entity is not entitled to treaty benefits in the first scenario. Some source 
countries treat such a case as a non-treaty situation and just apply their 
domestic laws, mostly at a much higher tax rate than the usual domestic
tax rate or treaty rate. However, the same logical flaw exists here,135 and,
again, the goal of tax neutrality between direct taxation and indirect taxation
cannot be achieved. 
What is worse in the second scenario is that Country A, and even Country
C, is not likely be able to figure out who the real taxpayer is due to the
nontransparency of Country B. These countries provide strict bank secrecy 
laws, making it nearly impossible for foreign countries to identify investors
133. For example, the Cayman Islands does not have a tax treaty with any country,
nor does it levy corporate income tax or any type of direct taxation on income earned offshore.
See OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX
PURPOSES: CAYMAN ISLANDS 2017 (SECOND ROUND) 24 (2017), https://read.oecd-ilibrary. 
org/taxation/global-forum-on-transparency-and-exchange-of-information-for-tax-purposes- 
cayman-islands-2017-second-round_9789264280168-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/E7X5-
YRMS]; TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, FINANCIAL SECRECY INDEX 2018: NARRATIVE REPORT ON
CAYMAN ISLANDS 13 (2018), https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/PDF/CaymanIslands.pdf
[https://perma.cc/39TB-GLSV].
134. See, e.g., William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1,
24, 48 (2019). To understand how the Cayman Islands’ local laws are designed to protect
banking privacy, see OECD, supra note 133; TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, supra note 133. The 
Tax Justice Network releases the Financial Secrecy Index of various countries and full 
data on each country in the list, available at http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com [https://
perma.cc/4MBP-NWNE].
135. If the source country treats the pass-through entity as a fiscally transparent entity, 
it means that it does not treat the pass-through entity as a taxpayer on the income, so it 
should determine who the real taxpayer is first.  If the real taxpayer is a resident of Country 
A, it would be a round-tripping case, where the income is derived through an offshore non-
CIV that is not a resident of the source country but such income is attributed to a resident 
of the source country.  If, however, the real taxpayer is a resident of Country C, which happens 
to have a tax treaty with Country A, it is not clear whether the treaty between Countries A 
and C would be applicable.  If it is not applicable, investors in Country C would be put in a 
worse position than the one they would be in had they invested in a target company in 
Country A directly. 
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in the vehicles domiciled in their jurisdiction.136 Had Country B entered
into tax treaties with Country A or C containing a tax information exchange 
provision, Country A or C might invoke that provision to seek tax information
relating to the vehicle. However, at present, Country B has not entered into
such tax treaties with the rest of the world. 
To overcome the lack of a treaty network with jurisdictions like Country
B, the OECD Global Forum Working Group on Effective Exchange of
Information released the Model Tax Information Exchange Agreements 
(TIEAs) in 2002.137 These model agreements allow international cooperation 
for exchanging tax information between competent authorities.138  There
are currently more than 500 TIEAs, and the United States has entered into 
TIEAs with most of the small-island tax havens.139 However, the scope of
information exchange is mostly limited to specific requests relating to an 
already-initiated tax investigation. As such, the TIEAs are still not effective
tools for exchanging broader information, such as a financial accounting
or identity of investors in the vehicles domiciled in Country B. 
2. Paradigm Case 3.2: Country Where Holding Company Is Located 
a. Treaty Shopping
When an SPC or holding company is interposed in a jurisdiction—Country 
B—different from the jurisdictions of investors and the target company,
Country B almost always has an extensive treaty network. It also almost 
always provides a holding company with a tax regime to maximize treaty
benefits. Therefore, Paradigm Case 3.2 exists as a more tax-oriented structure 
in a multinational setting. Country B is often called a “conduit jurisdiction.”140 
The distinction between a real tax avoidance case and a business conduit 
case becomes blurred here. 
136. See Moon, supra note 134, at 43. 





140. See Javier Garcia-Bernardo et al., Companies Use These Countries to Reach 
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Figure 10 Paradigm Case 3.2 
It would be fair to assume in Paradigm Case 3.2 that there is a tax treaty
between Countries A and B. Typical examples of Country B are Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, and Mauritius, all of which offer 
more favorable tax treaty benefits than the direct investment model.141 
Treaty shopping is a form of terminology used to describe the behavior of 
investors that select those countries with favorable tax treaty benefits.142 
Whether the holding company is entitled to treaty benefits depends on
the three requirements under the traditional rule: that is, again, whether it
is a person, resident, and beneficial owner of the income it receives. In 
contrast to the pass-through entity in the Paradigm Case 3.1, the SPC is
a corporation subject to comprehensive taxation in Country B. As a result,
it is more likely to meet the first two requirements: status as a legal person, 
and as a resident of Country B.143  However, as the SPC is a conduit, it is not 
certain whether it is entitled to treaty benefits, particularly given the beneficial
ownership requirement.
Until the late 1980s, countries were generous in admitting such holding
companies as beneficial owners of income received from the source 
141. Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises by
Employing a Hybrid Formulary and Arm’s Length Allocation Method, 28 VA. TAX REV. 619, 
648 (2009); Tax Treaties, TAX JUST. NETWORK, https://www.taxjustice.net/topics/corporate-
tax/tax-treaties/ [https://perma.cc/J969-24XK]. 
142. Grady, supra note 72, at 627. 
143. See OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24)-2. 
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country.144 However, most countries, especially source countries whose 
treaties with the conduit jurisdiction are at issue, became reluctant to recognize 
such holding companies as beneficial owners of the income.145  Furthermore,
the OECD report on the use of conduit companies146 and the Commentaries
on the Articles of the OECD Model implied that granting treaty benefits 
to a holding company that is merely a conduit may be inconsistent with 
the object and purpose of the tax treaty.147 
b. Hybrid Mismatch that Eliminates a Holding Company’s Tax Liability 
Treaty shopping is widespread in international tax practice.  It is relatively 
easy for governments and tax professionals to understand. However, the 
holding company regime in intermediate jurisdictions has been mysterious,
except to a handful of experts. It is quite rare to see materials that explain
such regimes. This lack of understanding has been a major obstacle in analyzing
the overall tax consequences of non-CIV transactions. Therefore, it would 
be useful to introduce how the actual holding company regime works in
the real world. 
One of the most popular holding company regimes is the société de 
participation financière (SOPARFI) of Luxembourg.148 This regime offers
a “participation exemption” that eliminates domestic entity-level tax on
dividends and capital gains received from its subsidiary if the SOPARFI 
144. See OECD, Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies, 
in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 2010, supra note 25, at R(6)-1, 
R(6)-2 [hereinafter OECD, CONDUIT REPORT].  The OECD Conduit Report was originally 
adopted by the OECD Council in 1986 to deny treaty benefits for an entity “with the main or 
sole purpose of obtaining treaty benefits which would not be available directly to such [entity].”  
Id.  Countries were especially willing to make this designation when the holding company 
had discretionary power to manage the investment independent from the investors. 
145. See id. at R(6)-2 (explaining that the tax advantages that a conduit company
enjoys is detriment to the source country). 
146. See generally OECD, CONDUIT REPORT, supra note 144. 
147. OECD, Commentaries on Model 2010, supra note 49, para. 12, at C(10)-3.
148. Julien Bieber, Gaëlle Auger & Linda Taing, Private Equity Structuring in
Luxembourg—Key Tax Aspects, in 38 TAX PLAN. INT’L REV. 11, 12–13 (2011). For the 
holding company regime in Luxembourg, thanks to Johan Léonard (N.Y.U. School of Law,
LL.M. in International Taxation 2014). This Part could not have been completed without his
helpful comments and explanation. Interview with Johan Léonard, Partner, NautaDutilh, 
in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Feb. 21, 2014). 
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holds 10% or more ownership in the subsidiary.149 It also provides flexible, 
thin capitalization rules150 and hybrid instruments.151 
Assuming Country A in Figure 10 is Belgium and Country B is Luxembourg, 
the dividend distributed by the target company is also subject to a 0%
withholding tax rate under the Belgium-Luxembourg tax treaty.152  As such, 
the tax on the SOPARFI’s income is not triggered in the source country.
Furthermore, tax obligations cannot be triggered on the income repatriated 
by the SOPARFI to its foreign investors, such as in the United States.
SOPARFIs have to comply with a flexible thin capitalization rule, which
requires a debt/equity ratio of 15% equity to 85% debt,153 or alternatively 
1% equity, 14% interest-free loan usually in the form of Convertible Preferred 
Equity Certificates (CPEC), and 85% interest-bearing loan, which is usually 
in the form of Preferred Equity Certificates (PEC).154  If the debt ratio exceeds
the above-mentioned ratio, interest on that excess debt will be treated as
dividend subject to Luxembourg’s 15% withholding tax.155  However, as
long as the specified debt/equity ratio is met, all repatriation of returns on 
investment to the investors is not subject to Luxembourg withholding tax 
under domestic tax law, regardless of the treaty benefits between Luxembourg
and the residence countries of investors.156 
Going back to the 85:15 debt/equity ratio, or the alternative 1% equity/
14% CPEC/85% PEC capital structure, both CPECs and PECs are hybrid 
instruments. From the U.S. perspective, PEC and CPEC are both equity,
149. Bieber, Auger & Taing, supra note 148, at 12. Participation exemption does not
exempt tax on interest income from a loan extended to the subsidiary.  However, that interest 
received can be effectively offset by interest payments out of interest-bearing loans to the 
shareholders, as long as the SOPARFI retains a small amount of taxable margin at 8 ~ 20 
basis points (bps), or 0.08 ~ 0.2%, and only such small margin will be subject to the normal 
Luxembourg corporate tax rate—29.22%. Interview with Johan Léonard, supra note 148. 
150. When a company is financed through a mixture of debt and equity, it often prefers
debt to equity because interest payments are deductible whereas dividends are not.  Thin 
capitalization rules aim to administer an adequate level of debt/equity ratio and deny deduction 
of certain interest payment of a company, if a company is financed through a relatively high 
level of debt compared to equity.  See Mitchell A. Kane, A Defense of Source Rules in 
International Taxation, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 311, 344 (2015).
151. Bieber, Auger & Taing, supra note 148, at 12–13. See generally Omri Marian,
The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
152. Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Regulation of Certain
Other Matters with Respect to Taxes on Income and Fortune, Belg.-Lux., art. 10, § 1, Sept. 
17, 1970, 870 U.N.T.S. 12503. 
153. Marian, supra note 151, at 28. 
154. See OGIER, LUXEMBOURG: STRUCTURING AND FINANCING PRIVATE EQUITY AND
VENTURE CAPITAL TRANSACTIONS (2017), https://www.ogier.com/media/brochures/ogier-
structuring-and-financing-private-equity-and-venture-capital-transactions.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8KZC-N5AH]. 
155. Marian, supra note 151, at 28. 
156. See id.
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not debt, while from the Luxembourg perspective, both PEC and CPEC are 
debt, the return of which is interest and deductible, although there would 
be no return for CPEC because it is an interest-free loan.157  One caveat is
that CPEC is considered as equity only for the purpose of the 85:15 debt/
equity ratio in Luxembourg.158 
The last puzzle of the capital structure is the 1% equity, the dividend 
payment on which is in principle subject to 15% Luxembourg withholding 
tax, unless there is a more favorable tax treaty between Luxembourg and
the residence country of investors who receive dividend. However, such
tax again can be eliminated by using “alphabet classes of shares.”159 
In sum, in Figure 10, there is no remaining tax liability in the whole picture,
except corporate tax of the target company to the source country Belgium,
income tax of the investors in their own residence country the United States, 
and the Luxembourg corporate income tax of the holding company with respect
to the interest income, which is not exempt under the participation regime. 
However, this final amount paid to Luxembourg is nominal.160 By providing
hybrid mismatch in back-to-back structure, the holding company is, in effect,
not liable to pay tax on the income it receives.161  It pays a nominal amount
157. The benefits of the hybrid nature of PEC and CPEC are not limited to Luxembourg 
taxation. Because the residence countries of investors, such as the United States, usually
provide more favorable tax treatment to dividend income than interest income, it is more
beneficial for investors’ tax position as well. See Bieber, Auger & Taing, supra note 148, 
at 13. The equity treatment of the hybrid instrument would be considered as benefits from 
the investors’ standpoint in the multinational fund investment structure. However, considering
that such investors would have held plain equity in a direct investment situation, investors 
are motivated to hold such hybrid instrument to neutralize their tax position in the residence
country in indirect investment. 
158. OGIER, supra note 154. 
159. To be specific, if, for example, a SOPARFI is supposed to receive income annually
from its subsidiary for ten years and it should repatriate corresponding income to its foreign
investors, it issues ten classes of alphabet stock, Class A through Class J, and liquidates a 
whole stock of one class annually in turn, instead of paying dividend to investors, until the 
stocks are exhausted. Because such partial liquidation is not subject to Luxembourg withholding
tax, and because the life span of PEFs is around a decade, this strategy will effectively
eliminate the withholding tax on the dividend income. 
160. Assuming that investors invest $100 in the holding company, $85 of which would 
be in the form of PEC. If the holding company extends a back-to-back loan by using such 
PEC to the target company at the interest rate of 10%, it should retain at least 8 bps margins, so
the interest rate of PEC would be 9.92%. Hence, only $0.068 (0.08% of $85) is annually 
subject to Luxembourg income tax, not to mention the various mechanisms to eliminate tax on
the inbound and outbound cash flow. $0.068 is very small figure even if we conservatively 
assume the rate of return at the level of the holding company as $10 (10% of $100). 
161. See, e.g., Marian, supra note 151, at 38. 
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on the small spread under the name of “income tax” to Luxembourg, but
in substance, this amount is more like a “fee” for the service and system
that Luxembourg provides, not an income tax.162  Omri Marian recently
demonstrated that this small spread depends on the “face amount” passing
through Luxembourg from source country to residence country, not on the 
income.163 To attract more investors and money flow through Luxembourg,
the fee is even discounted if the gross amount flowing through Luxembourg 
increases.164 
c. When the Treaty Benefits Are Denied
In the above example, the holding company is, in effect, not liable to pay 
tax on the income it receives. The only exception is a small taxable amount
in proportion to the face amount flowing through the country where it is 
located.165 Because this nominal tax is, in substance, a fee rather than income 
tax, it is fair for some source countries to argue that such a holding company
would not be entitled to the treaty benefits under the treaty between Countries 
A and B because it is not the beneficial owner of the income. 
The problems arise at this point, just as in Paradigm Case 3.1. There is
no coherent rule or practice in the current international tax regime when 
the tax treaty between Countries A and B is not applicable. Some source 
countries treat this situation as a non-treaty case and apply their domestic
laws.166 They mostly do so at a much higher tax rate than the usual domestic 
tax rate or treaty rate.167 However, once the tax authorities of the source 
countries deny the treaty benefits, they do not care about the further tax
consequences.168 Issues exist with respect to whether the source country
should find a true beneficial owner of the income, recast the transaction 
162. Id. at 29. 
163. See id. at 38. 
164. See id. at 37–38. 
TABLE 3 – MARGINS CHARGED BY LUXEMBOURG
Face Amount Financed through
Luxembourg (in EUR millions)
Taxable Margin
< 25  0.25%
25 to 187.5 0.125%
187.5 to 500 0.09357%
500 to 1,250 0.0625%
1,250 to 6,250 0.03125%
> 6,250 0.015625%
Id. at 38.
165. GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 18, at 311. 
166. See Birmingham & Bandoblu, supra note 43, at 18. 
167. See, e.g., id. at 19. 
168. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Interpreting Tax Treaties, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1387, 1419–20 
& 1420 n.205 (2016). 
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accordingly, and think about the tax consequences according to the recast
transaction. 
The OECD Commentary suggests as a solution that if the holding company 
is denied the status of beneficial owner, the beneficiary who is a resident 
of a third country, Country C, will be able to enjoy the treaty benefits under 
the tax treaty between the source country, Country A, and the third country, 
Country C, if there is such a treaty.169 Although the OECD Commentary 
does not mandate the provision of treaty benefits between the payer and
the beneficial owner, this position may serve the goal of tax neutrality between
direct investment and indirect investment.
It is fair to ask, however, whether it is legitimate to pursue tax neutrality 
by applying a treaty between Countries A and C here. Clearly, Paradigm
Case 3.2 is more likely to be related to tax avoidance by claiming more 
favorable benefits under the treaty between Countries A and B.  Some might 
argue that such a tax-avoiding transaction deserves a tax position that merely 
denies treaty benefits with no further analysis. This position would, in effect, 
operate as a penalty on investors. 
Nevertheless, such an argument is incomplete and perhaps a bit
irresponsible. In the case of domestic tax law, if transactions are challenged by
tax authorities and recast into a legitimate transaction, subsequent tax 
adjustment, taking into account the identity of the beneficial owner of the 
income derived from the transaction, is followed.170  The final tax liability
would be heavier than the original transaction in most cases, although that
is not always the case.171 But once it is determined that there is a tax avoidance,
tax consequences are determined based on such a recast transaction in a
logical and coherent way.172 The lack of such subsequently adjusting rules
ex ante in international tax is a huge defect as a complete system.
169. See OECD, Commentaries on Model 2010, supra note 49, para. 12.2, at C(10)-
4; para. 11, at C(11)-8; para. 4.2, at C(12)-2. 
170. Andrea Monroe, Too Big to Fail: The Problem of Partnership Allocations, 30
VA. TAX REV. 465, 475 (2011). 
171. Sometimes the recast transaction results in similar or even lesser tax liability than 
the original transaction does.  However, the change of tax liability in a less severe way is 
a factor to determine whether there is tax avoidance in the first place.  Id. at 475–76. 
749
 172.  See id. at 475–76, 483.  As a matter of fact, the domestic tax codes have penalty 
provisions, so the risk of less severe tax liability could be mitigated by the imposition of 
tax penalty provisions.  Scott D. Michel, Zhanna A. Ziering & Young Ran Kim, U.S. Offshore 
Account Enforcement Issues, 16 J. TAX PRAC. & PROC. 49, 50 (2014). 
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Figure 11. Paradigm Case 3.3 
3. Paradigm Case 3.3: Combined Structure 
The third paradigm case in a multinational setting is the combination of
Paradigm Cases 3.1 and 3.2. This scenario may be the most realistic non-
CIV structure as is shown in Figure 2. The problems are also compounded 
in this case. 
First, the holding company is typically a conduit located in the intermediate
jurisdiction.173 The holding company is not likely to pay the entity-level
taxation in effect to Country B.  This lack of payment eliminates tax
consequences on inbound and outbound cash flow, and it converts the character
of income to get a more favorable tax treatment in the investor countries.174 
Furthermore, there is almost always a very favorable tax treaty between
Countries A and B. The treaty benefits under the treaty between Countries 
A and B are, in most cases, more favorable than the treaty benefits under the 
treaty between Countries A and D. Moreover, there are often multiple layers 
of holding companies in multiple jurisdictions.175 Those holding companies
173. See OECD, Commentaries on Model 2010, supra note 49, at C(23)-4. 
174. See supra Section III.C.2. 
175. See supra Figure 2. 
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are designed not to trigger taxes, and some are used to advance third-party 
loans other than shareholder loans.176 
Second, the pass-through vehicle is designed for pooling capital from 
investors in various countries. Sometimes the pass-through vehicle is established
in the same country as some or all investors.  Sometimes, however, the pass- 
through vehicle is established in a different country from that of investors.  
In the latter case, it is most likely to be a small-island tax haven that provides 
a pass-through tax regime, a hybrid entity, exemption from tax on foreign 
source income, and confidentiality.177 However, Country C is not likely to
have a tax treaty with any of the remaining jurisdictions in Figure 11, which
breaks the chain of bilateral tax treaties.
In Figure 11, the only production of services and goods happens in the
target company in Country A, the source country. The capital for the investment
in the target company mostly comes from Countries D, E, and F, except
for certain third-party loans. It flows through to Country A.  The return
arising out of the target company also flows through the vehicles until it
reaches investors in Countries D, E, and F. Hence, the whole structure of 
this non-CIV may, in essence, be accomplishing what would have been 
accomplished by an indirect investment in a single or bilateral setting—that 
is, the structure does not trigger any substantial taxes in the middle of the 
cash flow. 
After all, investors often achieve more favorable tax consequences than 
the tax-neutral benchmark if the tax planning explained above is successfully 
respected by all relevant countries.178  However, many tax authorities, especially 
in source countries, have been challenging such preferential tax consequences
of investors by attacking the residency of holding companies or pass-through 
vehicles.179 Once they challenge the treaty benefits, tax authorities usually 
recast the transaction as a non-treaty case, where investors would receive
much worse tax consequences than the tax-neutral benchmark. Appendix
A briefly shows such results in hypothetical problems.180 
Furthermore, even if the treaty benefits are not challenged by tax authorities, 
another problem harms tax-neutral consequences for investors. That is, 
investors may not use foreign tax credits for the withholding tax paid to 
176. See, e.g., Wells & Lowell, supra note 23, at 543–44. 
177. See generally Benshalom, supra note 141, at 647–48. 
178. See, e.g., Grady, supra note 72, at 627–28. 
179. See LANG, supra note 114, at 40–41 (explaining the tension that typically arises 
between a source and residence country). 
180. See infra Part VII. 
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source countries because they are not technically taxpayers liable to such 
withholding tax.181 For example, the tax on the dividend income withheld 
by Country A, the source country, cannot be credited in Country B or C as
a foreign tax credit (FTC).182 This tax on the dividend income cannot be
credited because the pass-through entity or holding company is not liable 
for any taxes to Country B.183  The investors in Countries D, E, or F are not
likely to claim FTC, either, because from the residence country’s perspective,
the eligible foreign tax for FTC would be the one paid to Country C, or Country
B at best, not the one to Country A.184 This FTC problem also harms tax
neutrality in multinational fund investments. 
In sum, international tax law does not see the whole structure due to the 
restriction imposed by the bilateral structure of tax treaties.  The source
country focuses on the tax analysis with its most adjacent jurisdiction and 
determines whether the tax treaty between them would be applicable.  It
does not further analyze matters beyond that point, such as who will be
the real taxpayers of the income and what the tax rules should be for them.  
The residence country focuses on tax rules for repatriating the offshore 
money.185 However, there is no overarching approach linking the whole
level of taxation under a comprehensive ex ante rule. 
181. GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 18, at 309. 
182. Id. at 310. 
183. See, e.g., id.
184. There are examples of these FTC problems in South Korea. Korean investors 
in a Korean mutual fund invested in Brazil through a wholly-owned U.S. LLC. National 
Tax Service [NTS], International Tax Resource Management Office-335 (July 16, 2010) 
(S.  Kor.).  The  U.S.  LLC established a wholly-owned corporate  subsidiary in Brazil to 
invest in the real estate in Brazil.  Id.  The Brazilian subsidiary paid dividend to the U.S. LLC 
after withholding 15% tax.  Id.  Since the U.S. LLC checked the box to elect to be disregarded 
for U.S. tax purposes, it cannot claim direct FTC against such withholding tax, which 
should be available to the Korean investors instead.  Id.  However, Korean tax authorities 
held that Korean investors may not claim FTC against such withholding tax paid to the 
Brazilian government, thereby creating a double taxation problem where neither the U.S. 
LLC nor the Korean investors in U.S. LLC could claim FTCs.  Id.  In contrast, if Country 
C is the United States, the investor in Country C is likely to claim FTC.  GUSTAFSON, PERONI 
& PUGH ET AL., supra note 18, at 309–10. 
185. For example, controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules and passive foreign
investment company (PFIC) rules are anti-deferral regimes, aiming to eliminate the economic 
benefit of deferring U.S. taxes on the foreign-source income until they are repatriated to 
the United States.  I.R.C. §§ 951–65, 1291–98 (2012).  For general introduction and overview 
of the CFC and PFIC, see GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH , supra note 18, at 485–93.  The 
Proposal discussed in Section IV.D also intends to tax foreign-source income on a current 
basis by relying on the pass-through tax system, so both the Proposal and the anti-deferral 
regimes share the same position in terms of timing perspective.  However, as the CFC and 
PFIC is a top down approach, it has limitations on figuring out the overall structure of the 
cross-border investment all the way down to the source country if blockers are interposed 
in the middle of the structure. 
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Therefore, the investors in non-CIVs structure the transactions too 
aggressively to exploit the limit of bilateral solutions and sometimes achieve
substantially lower tax liability than the tax-neutral benchmark. However, 
when the source countries challenge the transactions ex post, the tax burdens
increase exponentially because the source countries do not consider multinational
dimensions of their tax policy.186  Either case is not desirable. 
Under the current bilateral approach, each country, where any vehicle is 
located, should count and be eligible to exercise tax jurisdiction in principle,
even though some intermediary jurisdictions are not exercising it but are 
merely severing as a blocker of the cash-flow and tax information for
international tax purposes. However, the vehicles in such jurisdictions would 
have been just disregarded or ignored for tax purposes under the pass-
through tax regime in domestic tax law. Does every country have enough 
reason to claim to exercise tax jurisdiction on the investment by non-CIVs 
just because it is an international transaction? If not, it is time to revisit the 
existing rules and suggest a new approach fit for a multinational setting. 
IV. ENGINEERING PASS-THROUGH RULES FOR MULTINATIONAL FUNDS
The previous Part examined the inadequate rules and practices of international 
taxation for multinational fund investments. To overcome the limited
bilateral approach, major trading countries and international organizations 
have studied and introduced multilateral approaches. This Part reviews
those efforts and introduces the Proposal for non-CIVs. 
A. OECD Partnership Report 
The OECD’s first effort to address the problem concerning multinational
fund investments took place in the 1990s.187 This approach was directed 
toward the different treatment of partnerships in an international context 
and the resulting double taxation or double non-taxation.188 
Many countries treat partnership as fiscally transparent for tax purposes.  
However, some countries, such as Belgium and France, treat them as entities 
186. See infra Part VII. 
187. See generally OECD, PARTNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 25. 
188. See generally F.A. Engelen & F.P.G. Pötgens, Report on “The Application of 
the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships” and the Interpretation of Tax Treaties, 
40 EUR. TAX’N 250 (2000). 
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with legal personality and subject them to corporate income tax.189  The
OECD Partnership Report in 1999 focused on such “conflicts of qualification”
of, and “conflict of income allocation” to, a partnership.190 These conflicts 
represent instances where the source country and residence country interpret 
or apply a treaty to that partnership in different ways.191 If an entity is not
widely used in the civil or commercial laws of treaty partners, one country
could treat the entity as a partnership while the other treats it as a company.192 
This outcome would lead, of course, to different tax results between treaty
partners.193 Focused on these types of issues, the Partnership Report 
emphasized a better coordination in the application and interpretation of 
some of the provisions of tax treaties.194 
The Partnership Report first suggests that if a partnership is liable to
tax in a country, it qualifies as a resident.195  The partnership is thus entitled
to treaty benefits. It then suggests entitling individual partners, but not the 
partnership, to the treaty benefits of the countries where partners are residents 
to the extent they are liable to taxation on their share of the partnership
income in countries where the partnership does not qualify as a resident.196 
When discussing the conflicts of qualifications in greater detail, the 
Partnership Report suggests that a useful starting point for determining
whether a partnership qualifies as a resident for treaty purposes is the
principle in the domestic law that governs matters regarding how an item 
of income is taxed.197 
Unfortunately, the Partnership Report failed to obtain full support from
the OECD member countries. France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Switzerland expressed reservations over the proposed changes to the
OECD Model Tax Convention.198  France noted that the proposed criteria
of being liable to tax are not sufficient in addressing situations where the 
entity is hybrid in nature—the entity is partly treated as a taxable unit and
partly disregarded for tax purposes.199 It further disagrees with the conclusion
that if treaty benefits to the partnership are refused, the partners would always
be entitled to the treaty benefits by their own country of residence.200  Lastly,
189. See Jean Schaffner, The OECD Report on the Application of Tax Treaties 
to Partnerships, 54 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 218, 218 (2000). 
190. OECD, PARTNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 25, at R(15)-3 to -4. 
191.  See id. 
192. Id. at R(15)-6.
193.  Id. 
194. See id. at R(15)-7. 
195.  Id. at R(15)-14.
196.  Id. 
197. Id. at R(15)-31; see LANG, supra note 114, at 31. 
198.  OECD, PARTNERSHIP REPORT, supra note 25, at R(15)-57 to -62. 
199.  Id. at R(15)-57.
200.  Id. 
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France asserted the “administrative difficulties” for implementing the proposed 
changes.201 Such problems included the flow of information for partnerships,
given that many partners may reside in different nations.202  Germany shared 
similar concerns regarding administrative difficulties, noting that “[i]t is
an extremely difficult task . . . to attribute the income subject to withholding 
tax to the partners, because the withholding agent does not know the often
very complicated and sometimes even abusive arrangement between the
partners on the division of profits (and losses).”203 
Despite the criticism and reservations, the OECD Committee on Fiscal
Affairs adopted the Partnership Report in 1999.204 The proposed changes
were reflected in the OECD Model Tax Convention in 2000.205 
B. OECD CIV Report 
A decade after it released the Partnership Report, the OECD resumed 
the discussion on the cross-border investment using pass-through vehicles. 
This time, the discussion was focused on CIVs, such as mutual funds, and 
excluded non-CIV funds from its scope.206 The OECD Model Commentary,
followed by the adoption of the CIV Report, suggested roughly four possible
provisions modifying the treatment of CIVs.207 Two of them could be
acknowledged as multilateral approaches.208 Although these suggestions
are limited to CIVs, they provide important insights for thinking about a
new multilateral approach for non-CIVs.
The first suggestion is the purely proportional approach. It suggests that
in the case where a CIV established in Country B receives income arising in
Country A, the CIV shall be treated as a resident of Country B.209 The CIV
also may be considered the beneficial owner of the income it receives, but 
only to the extent that the beneficial interests in the CIV are owned by  
equivalent beneficiaries.210 The equivalent beneficiaries include (1) a
201. Id. at R(15)-58 to -59.
202. See id.
203. Id. at R(15)-59.
204. Id. at R(15)-1.
205. OECD Model 2010, supra note 65, art. 23A, para 4, at M-52. 
206. See OECD, CIV REPORT, supra note 26, at R(24). 
207. OECD, Commentaries on Model 2010, supra note 49, paras. 6.21 to .34, at
C(1)-10 to -17. 
208. See id.
209. See id. para. 6.21, at C(1)-10 to -11.
210. Id.
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resident of Country B and (2) a resident of any other State, Country C, with
which Country A has a tax treaty, who would be entitled under that treaty,
or under the domestic law of Country A, to a rate of tax with respect to the
particular item of income that is at least as low as the rate claimed under 
the tax treaty between Country A and Country B by the CIV with respect to 
that income had the investor received that income.211 
The effect of this first approach is to achieve the goals of tax neutrality 
between direct investments and indirect investments through a CIV.212  At
the same time, it may prevent investors from abusing a CIV to achieve a
better treaty position than through direct investment, by way of the rate 
comparison in the definition of the equivalent beneficiary.213 
However, the CIV Report provides a second prong for the first suggestion, 
limited by bilateral solutions. If some states prefer the bilateral nature of 
tax treaties, they may not want to take all treaty-eligible investors, including
those in a third country, Country C, into account.214 In this case, the states
“may prefer to allow treaty benefits to a CIV only to the extent that the investors 
in the CIV are residents of the Contracting State in which the CIV is
established,” Country B.215 
The second suggestion is to provide an ownership threshold for the treaty
benefits. It provides that the purely proportional approach may “impose 
substantial administrative burdens as a CIV attempts to determine the
treaty entitlement of every single investor.”216 Hence, this suggestion considers
the rationale that if a substantial portion of the CIV’s investors are treaty-
eligible, a contracting state may decide that such CIV is not engaged in 
treaty shopping. Thus, if an amount is owned in the CIV above a certain
ownership threshold by either equivalent beneficiaries or a resident of the 
country where the CIV is established, the treaty “benefits would be provided 
with respect to all income received by the CIV.”217 
The two suggestions have their own distinctive merits. The former
reinforces the principle of tax neutrality between direct investment and 
indirect investment. The latter simplifies the procedures. However,
the purely proportional approach seems to be the most genuine multilateral 
approach. Nonetheless, even that approach does not entirely overcome
bilateral solutions because in order for it to function in the multinational
domain, there should be tax treaties in every part of the entire structure.  
211. Id. para. 6.21(b)(ii), at C(1)-10.
212.  Id. para. 6.23, at C(1)-11. 
213.  Id. para. 6.24, at C(1)-11. 
214.  See id. para. 6.26, at C(1)-12 to -13. 
215.  Id. 
216. Id. para. 6.27, at C(1)-13.
217.  Id. 
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This approach may not work if a country without a tax treaty, such as a 
country favored to pose a pass-through entity, is interposed. In addition, 
it is also a sign of bilateral solutions that the technically applicable tax treaty 
is the one between the source country and the residence country of the
immediate recipient of the income or CIV, although the benefits actually 
granted are from the treaty between the source country and the residence
country of the equivalent beneficiaries. A true multilateral approach should
be able to function in the multinational domain even if there is a missing
link in the treaty network and even if there is no such device as an equivalent
beneficiary clause.
C. OECD Non-CIV Discussion 
In 2016, as part of its BEPS project, the OECD began discussing non-CIV 
funds.218 The discussion, which continues today as of 2019, remains focused 
on the treaty entitlement of non-CIV funds rather than their overall problems.
However, the suggestions in the Public Discussion Draft from March 2016
(Non-CIV Discussion Draft) show much progress toward a multinational 
solution. This Article examines two suggestions that are relevant to a
multinational solution.219 
First, the Non-CIV Discussion Draft suggests that if (1) a non-CIV fund 
is treated as a transparent entity by the residence country of investors and
(2) the investor is taxed directly on its share of the income derived through
that non-CIV, treaty benefits with respect to that income will be generally 
available.220  The benefits will be available at the level of investors under 
218. See, e.g., OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28; OECD, BEPS
ACTION 6 DISCUSSION DRAFT ON NON-CIV EXAMPLES, supra note 28. 
219. OECD, NON-CIVDISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28, at10. The Non-CIV Discussion
Draft suggests five approaches relating to the limitation on benefits (LOB) provision as 
follows: (1) suggestion that treaty benefits be granted to regulated or widely held non-CIV 
funds; (2) suggestion relating to non-CIV funds set up as transparent entities; (3) suggestion 
that certain non-CIV funds be granted treaty benefits where a large portion of the investors 
would be entitled to the same or better benefits if they had received the income directly;
(4) suggestion that the LOB should not deny benefits to a non-CIV resident of a State with
which the non-CIV has a sufficiently substantial connection; and (5) suggestion of a “Global
Streamed Fund” regime. See generally OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28.
The first suggestion has very limited scope as it applies only to regulated alternative investment
funds, which is basically the same solution as the mutual funds.  The third and fourth suggestions 
are either similar to the existing solutions in the CIV Report or repeat the existing bilateral 
solutions, which may not resolve the problems in a multinational setting. On the other hand,
the second and fifth suggestions may be considered as multinational solutions. 
220. See id. at 5–7. 
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the treaty between the source country and the residence country of the 
investors.221 This transparent entity provision is expected to address not only 
the treaty-shopping concerns but also the hybrid mismatch problem.222 
Commentators suggest that a non-CIV should be able to elect to be treated
as fiscally transparent for treaty purpose. However, such an election would 
be a matter of domestic law that requires a non-CIV to attribute its income 
to its investors. 
An important strength of the transparent entity provision is that it confronts
the limitation of the existing bilateral approach of treaty entitlement and 
proposes a multinational solution. However, the Non-CIV Discussion Draft 
does not seem to recommend this approach strongly due to a key practical
difficulty: the approach requires the source country to be provided with 
all the relevant information concerning the investors in the non-CIV.223 
Many commentators argue that identifying the tax residence of the investors 
may not be possible “despite the evolving anti-money laundering legislation
and tax reporting regimes.”224 
The second noteworthy suggestion is a Global Streamed Fund (GSF) 
regime.225 The key features of this approach are that investment income
derived by a qualifying fund, a GSF, is exempted from any tax, including
withholding tax, if the fund distributes 100% of its income on a regular 
basis.226 Upon these distributions, the GSF should determine tax by the
treaty between the source country and the residence country of investors.227 
The GSF should then pay the so-determined tax, including withholding tax 
payable to the source country, to its own residence country—the intermediate
jurisdiction.228 The fund-residence country would then remit the so-collected
tax to the relevant countries, especially the source country.229 
The GSF regime is also recommended to be elective, not mandatory.230 
It may be implemented by amending tax treaties between participating
countries by requiring a GSF to apply the appropriate rate in relation to its 
distribution of the income relevant to this regime.231 The Non-CIV Discussion
221. Id. at 5. However, in the case of round-tripping, where the income is derived
through a non-CIV that is not a resident of the source country and such income is attributed 
to the investors who are residents of the source country, such benefits are not available. 
222. See id.
223. Id. at 6.
224. Id.






231. Id. at 11. It is also intended for closed-end non-CIVs rather than other types of
758
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Draft expects that the proposal also address not only the treaty shopping
concern but also the deferral concerns because a GSF would be required
to distribute 100% of its income.232 
Since the Non-CIV Discussion Draft was released in 2016, the OECD 
also has released another Discussion Draft on Non-CIV Examples.233  It
also has released comments received on the draft in February 2017.234  As
of September 2019, the final Non-CIV Report has yet to be published.
D. The Proposal for Non-CIV Funds
The bright side of these efforts is that the OECD is endeavoring to
accomplish tax neutrality in multinational fund investment. For example,
the GSF regime in the Non-CIV Discussion Draft suggests that as long as 
a fund distributes 100% of its income to its investors on a regular basis,
its tax consequences would be eliminated.235 The draft also suggests that 
the tax consequences for investors would be determined by considering 
only the source country and residence country.236 However, the discussion
regarding both CIV and non-CIV funds is limited to only the treaty entitlement
issue. Tax treaties are an important source of international tax law. However, 
when the fund investment is spread across multiple countries, it is highly 
likely that at least some of the countries do not have treaty networks with 
other countries involved in the investment structure. Focusing on the treaty 
entitlement issue may resolve the treaty shopping issue, but that is only a partial 
solution to the overall problem in multinational indirect investment. 
More importantly, the GSF regime gives intermediary countries the primary
authority to determine the overall tax consequences.237 It also grants them
authority to collect taxes on behalf of the source and residence countries
and to remit the tax to them.238 This approach requests the source and residence
countries to comply with the so-determined result.239 However, considering
232. Id.
233. OECD, DISCUSSION NON-CIV EXAMPLES, supra note 28. 
234. OECD, COMMENTS RECEIVED ON PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFT: BEPS ACTION 
6—EXAMPLES ON TREATY ENTITLEMENT OF NON-CIV FUNDS (2017), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/
treaties/Non-CIV-Examples-Compilation-of-Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/KMQ8-L47Q].
235. OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28, at 11; see supra notes 225– 
32 and accompanying text. 
236. OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28, at 10. 








     
  
         
   
        
 
   
        
  
     
       
   
   
  
    
   
      
  
 
         
    
 
  
        
    
   
 
      
           
           
              
         
        




that many aggressive tax planning techniques, such as treaty shopping, hybrid 
mismatches, and secrecy are mostly offered by intermediary countries, it
is difficult to justify their primary taxing power in multinational fund
investment. 
Therefore, this Article offers the following new alternative Proposal for 
non-CIV funds. The Proposal is as follows: As long as a fund distributes
100% of its income to its investors and, as a result, eliminates any substantial 
tax liability in the intermediary jurisdictions other than to the source country
and residence countries, such an investment scheme shall qualify for
international pass-through taxation.240 The investment fund would be able
to make the election to be treated in this manner. By doing so, the source 
country and residence country shall together determine whether the fund 
is qualified for such international pass-through taxation.241  The source 
country and residence country shall also collect taxes as if the investment
was made directly from the residence country to the source country. Therefore,
multinational indirect investors may achieve tax-neutral consequences as
if they invested directly. Intermediate countries are required to cooperate 
in the process.
The end result of the Proposal would be similar to that of the OECD’s
approach. However, the Proposal may serve as a more effective alternative,
as it grants primary tax authority to source countries and residence countries 
that are entitled to such tax, rather than the intermediary countries interposed
between them, which have been contemplated as the origin of many existing
problems. 
240. There is potential pushback on the 100% distribution requirement—such
a requirement may create another cliff effect for taxpayers and suggesting lowering the 
threshold to, for example, 90% equivalent to the 90% distribution rule for domestic SPCs 
or adopting a proportional pass-through rule in proportion to the distribution amount.
However, the OECD is concerned about lowering the threshold from 100% because investors
may defer recognition of income on which treaty benefits have been granted if a 100%
distribution is not required. Id. at 11.  Considering there is not a good reason to retain the
funds in the intermediary, taxpayers can easily avoid such a cliff effect. 
241. The process will be initiated only if the investment fund makes the election to be
treated as a pass-through entity. The election should be filed with tax authorities in both
the source country and the residence country.  If the two countries come up with different 
answers, a dispute resolution mechanism should be available. The mutual agreement procedure
(MAP) in Article 25 of the OECD Model has been developed vigorously these days as part of
the BEPS Project, and, thus, it would be a good resource for the Proposal, as well. See OECD,
MAKING DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS MORE EFFECTIVE, ACTION 14: 2015 FINAL REPORT,
OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT (2015), https://read.oecd-ilibrary. 
org/taxation/making-dispute-resolution-mechanisms-more-effective-action-14-2015-final-
report_9789264241633-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/F456-47GA]. More details on how the
source country and residence country would cooperate would be the task of a future project.
760
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V. IMPLEMENTATION: THE CASE OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS
The purpose of the Proposal toward the international tax system is to
ensure pass-through taxation in appropriate cases. In the previous Part,
this Article argued that, to date, the international tax regime has not provided 
an established pass-through tax rule or partnership tax rule, mainly because
of the prevalence of bilateralism. However, the traditional practice of 
bilateralism in the international taxation sphere is not the only obstacle to
implementing a pass-through tax regime. Even if the Proposal as a multilateral
approach is implemented, two further prerequisites will be required: (1) 
the provision of information on investment by non-CIVs242 and (2) the
exchange of such information among relevant tax authorities. This Part 
examines what information the non-CIVs should provide with relevant tax
authorities and how, and with whom, the tax authorities would then share 
that information. It also shows that there is a unique implementation 
opportunity of the Proposal in the case of PEFs. 
A. Prerequisites for the Proposal
1. Provision of Information on Investment 
The first prerequisite is to obtain information on the investment of a particular 
non-CIV. The necessary information includes the overall structure of the 
non-CIV in question and the identity of investors. Thus, the most important 
concern is whether the relevant tax authorities may institutionally obtain 
such information and whether the non-CIV and its investors would be 
willing to cooperate with tax authorities to provide such information. 
a. Regulatory Permission 
First, it will be necessary to devise solutions to regulatory and contractual 
difficulties faced by the relevant parties. Non-CIVs might still be unwilling 
to provide such information to the extent that they are bound by confidentiality
obligations toward their investors. 
242. This is a third-party information reporting, because the taxpayers in a non-CIV
investment are the investors, not the non-CIV itself; just like the taxpayers in a partnership 
investment is the partners, not the partnership.  For the importance of third-party information 
reporting by business firms in tax administration, see generally Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. 
Dugan, Information Matters in Tax Enforcement, 2020 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
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One may find the confidentiality excuse is similar to the long-lasting 
argument of Swiss banks against becoming more transparent, relying on 
their Bank Secrecy Law.243 However, Swiss banks’ resistance against
transparency has relented in the face of the recent global changes toward
enhanced transparency on tax information.244  The new institutional regime
for international taxation toward transparency, such as Automatic Exchange 
of Information (AEOI) and the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA), discussed in Subsection A.2, made Switzerland abandon its Bank
Secrecy Law and cooperate to provide tax information of its bank customers 
to the customers’ residence countries.245 
Furthermore, the European Union (EU) has devised a directive, known 
as DAC 6, that imposes mandatory disclosure requirements for an intermediary
entity and its advisers to report cross-border arrangements with tax-avoidance 
hallmarks, discussed in Section III.C, as from June 25, 2018.246 
This Article argues that this new global regime will contribute to conditions 
under which the non-CIV industry is more likely to overcome regulatory 
and contractual hurdles and become more transparent. Before the emergence 
of the new regime, it was a legitimate question to ask whether the non-CIV 
industry was ready and willing to voluntarily become more transparent.
However, the new regime, particularly the FATCA, applies to the extended 
category of financial institutions, which include not only traditional banking 
industry, but also alternative investment entities, such as PEFs and hedge 
funds.247 Therefore, the transparency for non-CIVs is expected to become 
mandated soon, and it is hoped that the contribution of this Article to the 
new regime will be several improvements applicable to non-CIVs.
b. Provision to Source Country 
A caveat of the new regime is that it requires financial institutions, including
non-CIVs, to provide tax information regarding structure and investor 
identity. Institutions must provide this information to either the jurisdiction
where the financial institution is located or the jurisdiction where the 
taxpayers maintain residency.
All the while, the Proposal requires non-CIVs to provide information to 
the source country jurisdictions. Thus, in addition to the current reporting
requirement to the residence country imposed by FATCA and FATCA-like 
243. Stuart Gibson, Swiss Bank Secrecy—Their Lips Say Yes, but Their Eyes Say No, 
FORBES (Apr. 5, 2017, 1:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2017/04/05/switzerland-
their-lips-say-yes-but-their-eyes-say-no/#35732b3f5783 [https://perma.cc/B7JZ-RDL6]. 
244. See id.
245. See infra Section V.A.2. 
246. Council Directive 2018/822, 2018 O.J. (L 139/1) 1. 
247.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5(e)(4)(i)(C) (2018). 
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laws, the Proposal needs additional domestic legislation that requires non-
CIVs to report relevant tax information to source countries as well. 
2. Exchange of Information 
For an accurate tax analysis, relevant tax information should also be
shared among all relevant tax authorities in a timely manner. Thus, the
second prerequisite of the Proposal is the exchange of information (EOI) 
collected among relevant tax authorities for accurate and consistent tax 
administration throughout.
Fighting offshore tax evasion has become a top priority of international 
tax policy in recent decades.  After going through the LGT Bank affair248 
and the UBS scandal,249 the EU and the United States, the two most important
voices in international tax law, realized they were vulnerable to offshore tax
evasion and were losing enormous tax revenues as a result. They also realized
that they had not fully caught up with the techniques used by their domestic 
citizens of using offshore vehicles to “round-trip” or “circulate” funds. In 
addition, the global financial crisis in 2007, which was caused by the reckless 
practices of certain financial institutions, offered an opportunity to implement
a more active regulatory policy. It also triggered a global discussion regarding 
overall transparency in the financial industry, from which a new regime
for international taxation is emerging.
A couple of important developments are worth noting, including the Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 
248. In 2008, Heinrich Kieber, a former employee of LGT Truehand, a trust company
affiliated with LGT Bank in Liechtenstein, stole customer data and provided it to tax authorities
throughout the EU and to the IRS under a newly enacted whistleblower provision. See Lynnley 
Browning, Banking Scandal Unfolds Like a Thriller, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at C8. 
249. In 2007, Bradley Birkenfeld exposed the tax avoidance strategies of UBS, where
UBS advised the U.S. taxpayers to establish foreign shell entities, which then opened offshore 
accounts at the UBS based on the position that such offshore accounts need not be withheld 
at the rate for the U.S. taxpayers nor be disclosed to the IRS. Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason, 
United States National Report on Exchange of Information 2–3 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-22, 2014); see Treas. Reg.§1.1441-1; Itai Grinberg, 
The Battle over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLAL. REV. 304, 325–26 (2012). 
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(Global Forum)’s initiative for AEOI,250 the U.S. FATCA,251 the OECD’s 
BEPS project,252 and the EU’s various implementation measures.253  
a. EOI System 
The exchange of tax information is not a new system. To enforce domestic 
tax law fully and fairly, access to tax information from other countries is 
critical.254 Therefore, bilateral tax treaties have included EOI clauses
since World War II.255 Among various forms of EOI—including “upon
request,” “spontaneous,” and “automatic” EOI (AEOI)—the default rule for 
EOI has been EOI upon request.256 
However, EOI upon request has not been sufficient to fight against offshore
tax evasion.257 It has not provided information on non-compliant cases in
a timely manner due to the bureaucratic procedures for request.258  Furthermore,
it has not been sufficient for tax authorities to detect noncompliant cases
in the absence of previous indications of noncompliance.259 
To overcome the limitations of the EOI upon request, AEOI is considered 
as an alternative. After several attempts,260 AEOI finally obtained momentum
in the late 2000s, under the auspices of the Global Forum, when tax
transparency became the priority of the international tax policy.261  Since
2009, the Global Forum has pressured its member states to adopt broader
250. See generally Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for
Tax Purposes, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/ [https://perma.cc/64SK-YV59]. 
251. See generally Summary of FATCA Reporting for U.S. Taxpayers, IRS (Jan. 29,
2019), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/summary-of-fatca-reporting-for-us-taxpayers 
[https://perma.cc/4H4Q-RYE3].
252. See generally International Collaboration to End Tax Avoidance, OECD, http:// 
www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ [https://perma.cc/D7NH-Q5CW].
253. See, e.g., Dario Paternoster, General Tax Policy, EUR. PARLIAMENT (May 2019), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/92/general-tax-policy [https://perma.cc/
5434-V7CD].
254. Grinberg, supra note 249, at 313. 
255. Id. at 313–14. 
256. OECD, Commentaries Tax Convention, supra note 49, para. 9.1, at C(26)-5; see
Grinberg, supra note 249, at 314–15.  To be specific, Article 26 of the OECD Model requires 
EOI upon request, permits automatic EOI, and forbids fishing expedition.  See generally 
OECD Model 2010, supra note 65, art. 26, at M-62. 
257. See Grinberg, supra note 249, at 313–17. 
258. See id. at 315–17. 
259. See id.
260. The efforts to adopt AEOI by the EU and the OECD had been frustrated by the 
resistance of several countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland.  Id. at 
314–15. 
261. Michel, Ziering & Kim, supra note 172, at 76–77. 
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EOI provisions in accordance with the OECD standard.262  One of the
outcomes was the revision of the Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters (MAAC) in 2010, in which 126 jurisdictions 
were participating as of November 2018.263 Although the revised MAAC 
did not set AEOI as an obligation, it provides a legal basis and a platform
for AEOI to be implemented multilaterally.264 
With the success of the revised MAAC, along with the enactment of the 
U.S. FATCA in 2010, AEOI has been met with widespread political support 
since 2012. In 2014, G20 leaders and finance ministers endorsed AEOI
as the “new single global standard.”265 In 2014, the OECD released the
Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for AEOI on financial account,266 
calling on governments to obtain detailed account information from their
262. The Global Forum now includes 154 member states with 12 observers, making
it the largest tax group in the world. Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information
for Tax Purposes, supra note 250. 
263. Stafford Smiley, Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, 40 J. CORP.TAX’N
21, 21 (2013). For a chart listing participating jurisdictions, see OECD, JURISDICTIONS 
PARTICIPATING IN THE CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX
MATTERS STATUS (2019), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/120718
_Article%2026-ENG_no%20cover%20(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/WL7M-JNMX]. The United 
States signed the MAAC in 2010, which was submitted to the Senate for ratification in 2012.
Patrick Temple-West, Senator Paul Stirs Business Ire Over Blocking of U.S. Tax Treaties, 
REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-tax-treaties/senator-paul-
stirs-business-ire-over-blocking-of-u-s-tax-treaties-idUSL2N0AJFS320130428 [https://perma.cc/
B859-2NUT]. However, the Senate has yet to ratify it along with other tax treaties, mainly 
due to the strong opposition by Senator Rand Paul, a Republican from Kentucky.  Id.
264. Although the focus of the EOI system is moving to the AEOI, EOI upon request 
still matters because the current AEOI system is limited to financial account information, 
whereas EOI upon request is available to all kinds of tax information. Hence, the Global Forum 
is also working to enhance EOI upon request. OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND 
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES, TAX TRANSPARENCY: 2014 REPORT ON PROGRESS
31 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/GFannualreport2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3RPB-7G94]. 
265. OECD Delivers New Single Global Standard on Automatic Information, OECD 
(Feb. 13, 2014), https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/taxation/oecd-delivers-new-single-global-
standard-on-automatic-exchange-of-information.htm [https://perma.cc/D3JB-RDHS].
266. Rick Mitchell, Practitioner Sees Possible Negative Effect on Banks as U.S.
Hesitates on Global Standard, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) (Oct. 29, 2014).  CRS is modeled 
on the U.S. FATCA.  See id.; see also Rick Mitchell, Switzerland Signs OECD Agreement 
On Automatic Tax Information Exchange, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) (Nov. 19, 2014).  The 
OECD later adopted the full and comprehensive report on the CRS.  OECD, STANDARD FOR 
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financial institutions and to exchange that information automatically with 
other jurisdictions on an annual basis.267 The rationale behind the CRS is
to generate advantages arising from “process simplification, higher effectiveness 
and lower costs for all stakeholders concerned.”268  As of April 25, 2019,
105 countries have signed a multilateral instrument to implement the AOI 
with the CRS.269 The first AEOI among the group of 49 countries began
in 2017, and the subsequent group of 51 countries, including Switzerland, 
followed in 2018.270 
Ironically, the United States has not committed to any multilateral instrument 
requiring AEOI, such as MAAC and CRS MCAA.271 However, the United 
States has undertaken AEOI since 2015 pursuant to FATCA and relating
intergovernmental agreements with other jurisdictions,272 which will  be  
discussed below. 
b. U.S. FATCA 
Congress enacted FATCA in 2010 to combat offshore tax evasion.273 
FATCA requires that foreign financial institutions (FFIs) and other foreign 
entities receiving payments from U.S. sources undertake a series of steps 
to identify accounts held by U.S. persons and report information regarding 
those accounts on an annual basis to the IRS.274 It is noteworthy that
FATCA sets a category of “investment entity” in the definition of FFI and 
includes alternative investment vehicles, including PEFs, in that category.275 
Failure to comply could subject the affected institution to a series of 30% 
withholding tax on certain U.S. source income.276 
267. See THE STANDARD, supra note 266, at 13, 15.
268. Id. at 11. The Standard further provides guidance on IT solutions relating to data 
safeguards and confidentiality standards and the transmission and encryption for secure 
transmission of information under the CRS.  Id. at 17. 
269. OECD, SIGNATORIES OF THE MULTILATERAL COMPETENT AUTHORITY AGREEMENT
ON AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION AND INTENDED FIRST
INFORMATION EXCHANGE DATE (2018), http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/
international-framework-for-the-crs/MCAA-Signatories.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD9Q-QEWK].





273. Summary of FATCA Reporting for U.S. Taxpayers, supra note 251. 
274.  See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 97, 
97–99 (2010). 
275. Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Considering “Citizenship Taxation”: In Defense of
FATCA, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 335, 362 (2017); see Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5(e)(4)(i)(C) (2017). 
276. Summary of FATCA Timelines, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/ 
summary-of-fatca-timelines [https://perma.cc/D43S-X6L4] (last updated June 5, 2018).
Such withholding tax has been imposed on fixed or determinable annual or periodic (FDAP) 
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One concern that has arisen is whether FFIs can provide financial
information to the United States pursuant to FATCA without violating 
their own domestic banking and privacy laws, as well as the terms of their 
contractual relationships with their clients.277 To address this issue, the
United States suggested an alternative approach to the implementation of 
FATCA by entering into inter-governmental agreements (IGAs) that would 
allow FFIs to comply with FATCA obligations without violating the laws 
of their residence countries.278 Starting with the United Kingdom in 2012, 
more than 100 countries, including major trading partners as well as bank 
secrecy jurisdictions, such as the Cayman Islands and Switzerland, have 
signed or initialed agreements with the United States.279 
The major criticism of FATCA in the early phase was that it unilaterally
imposed extraterritorial obligations on FFIs solely for the benefit of the 
United States.280 Even after the U.S. government committed to enter into
IGAs to solve issues caused by the unilateral and extraterritorial nature of 
FATCA, and even after the FATCA obtained global political support as
momentum for AEOI, many practitioners and government officials complained
about the complex compliance procedure.281 
Notwithstanding such criticism, FATCA has provided momentum for
global AEOI. In addition to the AEOI work by the OECD, FATCA spurred
income since July 1, 2014. Id.  Withholding tax on gross proceeds from the sale or disposition 
of any property that gives rise to FDAP income began January 1, 2019. Id.
277. See Tracy A. Kaye, Innovations in the War on Tax Evasion, 2014 BYU L. REV. 
363, 364–65; see also Grinberg, supra note 249, at 336. 
278. See Grinberg, supra note 249, at 336–37; Kaye, supra note 277, at 366. 
279. Ian Bone, FATCA: Compliance by Foreign Jurisdictions, WOLTERS KLUWER
(June 14, 2017), https://ct.wolterskluwer.com/resource-center/articles/fatca-compliance-
by-international-jurisdictions [https://perma.cc/GT96-UUUH]; Michel, Ziering & Kim, 
supra note 172, at 72. As of February 23, 2017, ninety-six countries—including major trading
partners as well as tax secrecy jurisdictions, such as Bermuda, BVI, Cayman Islands, Isle of
Man, Guernsey, Panama, Hong Kong, and Singapore—have signed IGAs with the United 
States. Kim, supra note 275, at 361. “Seventeen countries, including China, have initiated
IGAs, and a couple of other countries are in discussions with U.S. authorities about entering
into IGAs.” Id. See IGA Status, TAX NOTES, https://www.taxnotes.com/FATCA-expert/ 
IGA-status [https://perma.cc/9Z7X-PUQ3], for the current IGA status.
280. Grinberg, supra note 249, at 336. 
281. See, e.g., Hillis v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2016] 2 F.C. 235, 238 (Can.).  For the 
costs and negative collateral consequences of FATCA, see generally Shu-Yi Oei & Diane 
Ring, Leak-Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. 532, 601–08 (2018). 
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similar legislation in various jurisdictions.282 Such FATCA-like legislations 
and agreements are expected to be integrated in the platform of AEOI  
arranged by the Global Forum.283 
In conclusion, FATCA appears to have triggered an irreversible trend 
toward AEOI. Thanks to the emergence of this new regime in international
taxation, this Article may safely assume the enhanced level of EOI and 
multilateral cooperation in tax administration for the Proposal. 
c. EU ATADs and DAC6 
Building upon the recent developments discussed above, such as the 
OECD BEPS project and AEOI, the European Commission (EC) also has 
been adopting various measures designed for its member states. Two measures
worth noting with respect the Proposal are the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives
(ATADs)284 and the DAC6.285 
The EC adopted the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package in 2016 to ensure
harmonized implementation of the OECD BEPS project within the EU.286 
The Package includes a proposal for an Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 
(ATAD 1)287 and the amendment to the Directive on mutual assistance to 
apply AEOI to country-by-country reporting.288  Thereafter, the EC adopted
ATAD 2 in 2017289 as an amendment to ATAD 1 in order to combat the
hybrid mismatch problem in the EU, including those demonstrated in
Subsection III.C.2.b.290 
282. See John McCann & Angela Nightingale, Tax Information Sharing, the Rise
of “FATCA-esque” Agreements, 94 AIMA J. 71, 71–72 (2013), for examples in the United 
Kingdom and France.
283. See Grinberg, supra note 249, at 380–82. 
284. See generally Council Directive Proposal for Amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 
as Regards Hybrid Mismatches with Third Countries, COM (2016) 687 final (Oct. 25, 2016). 
285. See generally Council Directive 2018/822, supra note 246, at 1. 
286. The Anti Tax Avoidance Directive, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_
customs/business/company-tax/anti-tax-avoidance-package/anti-tax-avoidance-directive_en
[https://perma.cc/Z75M-FLV3]; see Rita de la Feria, Editorial, Harmonizing Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Rules, 26 EC TAX REV. 110, 110 (2017). 
287. See generally Council Directive Proposal for Laying Down Rules Against Tax 
Avoidance Practices that Directly Affect the Functioning of the Internal Market, at 3, COM 
(2016) 26 final (Jan. 28, 2016). 
288. Council Directive Proposal for Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as Regards
Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, at 2–4, COM (2016) 
25 final (Jan. 28, 2016). 
289. Council Directive 2017/952, 2017 O.J. (L 144) 1, 1–2 (EU). 
290. Substantively, ATAD 2 applies to four categories of hybrid mismatches: (1) “that
result from payments under a financial instrument;” (2) “that are the consequence of differences 
in the allocation of payments made to a hybrid entity or permanent establishment, including as 
a result of payments to a disregarded permanent establishment;” (3) “that result from payments 
made by a hybrid entity to its owner, or deemed between the head office and permanent 
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The second Directive on the AEOI was further amended in 2018.291  As
from June 25, 2018, the so-called DAC6 calls for the mandatory disclosure
of information by intermediary entities in the multinational fund structure,
and in some cases taxpayers, on potentially aggressive tax planning schemes,
many of which are criticized in Section III.C.292 Furthermore, the DAC6 
imposes a mandatory EOI on so-collected reportable cross-border transactions 
among EU member states to crack down the tax abusive schemes.293 However, 
the question remains whether the EU will allow the United States to be
privy to this collected information through other channels for the AEOI. 
d. Rationale for EOI as a Prerequisite 
In the new regime oriented toward enhanced transparency discussed
above, the tax information is usually obtained by a jurisdiction where non-
CIVs are located.  Alternatively, this information is sometimes obtained by a
jurisdiction of an investors’ residence country at first hand.  The information 
is more comprehensive than that currently available to the source country, 
such that exchanging the information through EOI upon request and AEOI 
would theoretically help to implement the Proposal. 
However, there are more important reasons why the Proposal needs EOI 
as a prerequisite. If the Proposal just relies on the information available 
through EOI, the inevitable time lag between the income distribution and
information provision would significantly delay the tax analysis, which 
establishment or between two or more permanent establishments;” and (4) “double deduction
outcomes resulting from payments made by a hybrid entity or permanent establishment.”  
Id. at 3.
291. See generally Council Directive 2018/822, supra note 246. 
292. See id. at 2; Fionnuala Lynch, Insight: DAC 6—New EU Tax Disclosure Rules: 
Cause for Concern?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.bna.com/insight-dac-
6new-n73014481548/ [https://perma.cc/6CZC-BBXG]. An intermediary that is subject to
the reporting obligation includes advisory firms, such as accounting firms and law firms, 
which is in line with the movement to combat the aggressive tax planning by enforcing 
professional ethics of the tax advisers. See generally Heather M. Field, Aggressive Tax Planning 
& The Ethical Tax Lawyer, 36 VA. TAX REV. 261 (2017).  Member states must put DAC6
into effect by December 31, 2019, but a retrospective element exists that calls for member 
states to consider potential reportable transactions that occurred on or before June 25, 
2018. ALLEN & OVERY, DAC6—MANDATORY DISCLOSURE TAX REPORTING, WHAT DOES




293. See Council Directive 2018/822, supra note 246, at 4.
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should be done at the time of distribution. Hence, the Proposal requires the
source country to be provided with tax information and initiate the analysis
of tax consequences of the non-CIV investment when a target company in
the source country distributes income to upper level entities. Such tax
information includes offshore tax information that is not originally subject 
to its tax jurisdiction. Under the Proposal, the information may be timely
provided during the process of the tax analysis done by the source country.  
However, the accuracy of information collected would be limited if there 
are no means for the source country to verify such information by comparing
it with the information on the same transaction obtained by the residence 
country. Therefore, as a prerequisite for the Proposal, implementation requires 
comprehensive information-sharing in addition to the current AEOI 
requirements.
For this purpose, the drawback of the time lag between the income 
distribution and information sharing could be alleviated because the information
sharing is essential not just for initiating the tax analysis by tax authorities 
but for verifying the tax compliance.  If the information provided by taxpayers
to a source country turns out to be inaccurate in the later stage when tax 
authorities verify it with the shared information, then tax authorities would
need to reassess the relevant tax and collect the deficient tax amount. Such
rectification might be cumbersome, but the systematic process for improvement 
will surely improve taxpayers’ compliance with the Proposal.294 
B. The Case of Private Equity Funds: Administrable  
Number of Investors 
A potential criticism of the Proposal is that it is not practical for source 
and residence countries to administer the tax consequences of multinational
investment funds because not all relevant information concerning investors
may be available to the source countries.295 Before the world was equipped 
with operational AEOI and FATCA, this information was not available
because it was relating to offshore entities and accounts that were beyond 
tax sovereignty of a country. Pursuing such information meant extraterritorial 
exercise of tax sovereignty.  In the new regime toward transparency, however,
that concern has been alleviated. 
But even if we assume that we are going to live in a world equipped 
with the second prerequisite—operational AEOI—it is not certain that
such a system would consistently or reliably identify investors behind  
294. The risk of noncompliance still exists if the only effective way to collect tax in 
the Proposal is by withholding tax.  However, such risk is not unique to the Proposal but rather 
applies to the overall withholding tax system in international tax. 
295. See OECD, DISCUSSION NON-CIV EXAMPLES, supra note 28, at 5. 
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non-CIVs for at least two reasons. First, given that the investment structure 
of many non-CIVs covers multiple jurisdictions, information shared piece 
by piece—or country by country—does not necessarily provide a complete 
picture including all relevant investors and ultimate beneficial owners. 
Second, AEOI and FATCA apply to financial institutions only, while certain
entities in the chain of non-CIV investment structure are often non-financial
business entities, such as a corporation, a partnership, or a hybrid entity,
which are not included in traditional definitions of financial institutions 
and are therefore not likely to be subject to the obligation to provide information
to tax authorities under those systems.296 
Such problems of identifying taxpayers could be solved to the extent
that the Proposal requires non-CIVs to provide such information not only 
to the residence country but also to the source country. However,
commentators still assert practical difficulty for some types of non-CIV 
funds in identifying the tax residence of their investors and thus their
inability to provide such information to source country.297 
To illustrate the viability of the Proposal, this Article offers a unique 
implementation opportunity for the Proposal in the case of PEFs by showing
that PEFs have an administrable number of investors to identify their residence 
country.
PEFs, which are essentially privately held partnerships, are a representative
example of the non-CIV. PEFs use investment structure similar to that of 
CIVs, but PEFs’ structure are largely more complex than that of CIVs
because it contains “multiple layers of pass-through entity and corporate-
type special purpose vehicles spread across multiple jurisdictions.”298 They 
are less transparent to the public than FDI and CIVs, and the information
is less available even to the domestic regulatory agencies because reporting 
requirements have been limited.299  That is why the OECD first discussed
CIVs in its discussion on international indirect taxation and then moved
on to non-CIVs, such as private equity.
However, if the administrative authorities tried to obtain information on
the individual investors behind the investment vehicles, it would be easier
to do so for PEFs than for CIVs. This is because PEFs tend to have only 
296. See OECD, NON-CIV DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 28, at 6.
297. The Non-CIV Discussion Draft illustrates that a securitization company “may
not be in a position to identify who its bondholders” are in a fund of funds “where a financial 
institution invests in a CIV on behalf of its own clients.”  Id. 
298. Kim, supra note 8, at 446. 
299. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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a handful of high-profile investors, which rarely change during the lifetime 
of a fund,300 while CIVs generally have many more, including private retail
investors. Based on the author’s empirical research through the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission EDGAR database301 and PitchBook database,302 
the average number of total limited partners (LPs), who are not managing
funds but rather investing in a cross-border private equity fund, for the 
past ten years is fifty-seven.303 This is a considerably smaller and more 
manageable number than the average 34,411 investor units listed per mutual
fund.304 
300. See TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 33, at 187. 
301. EDGAR stands for the “Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval”
system. Important Information about EDGAR, SEC (Feb. 16, 2010), https://www.sec. 
gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm [https://perma.cc/6DCW-BY8Y]; see EDGAR Company Filings, 
SEC, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html [https://perma.cc/LH7H- 
J822] (providing accessibility to company filings). 
302. PitchBook is a software-as-a-service (SaaS) Company, offering private market
data not available in the S&P 500 Index, Moody’s, and EDGAR. See Pitchbook Continues
on Path to Become One-Stop-Shop for Private & Public Financial Market Data with Launch
of Intraday Market Data, PITCHBOOK (Apr. 24, 2018), https://pitchbook.com/media/press-
releases/pitchbook-continues-on-path-to-become-one-stop-shop-for-private-public-
financial-market-data-with-launch-of-intraday-market-data [https://perma.cc/Q2UJ-SWWJ].
It is specialized in PEFs, venture capital, mergers and acquisitions, and IPO.  See id.  It sources
fund-related data primarily from private reporting to itself by limited partners. PITCHBOOK, 
PITCHBOOK BENCHMARKS: PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL DATA THROUGH 1Q
2017, at 4 (2017), https://pitchbook.com/news/reports/4q-2017-pitchbook-benchmarks [https:// 
perma.cc/5MZF-JE5S].  It also collects data from Form D filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), which are a type of exemption that companies may employ 
in the offering and sale of securities without the requirement of registration for such with 
the SEC. Email from Peter Leslie, Account Manager, PitchBook, to Young Ran (Christine) Kim, 
Assoc. Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law, (Mar. 1, 2018, 6:06 AM & 2:01 PM 
MDT) (on file with author).  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2018), for Form D filings. 
303. I generated a list of 303 private equity funds that engage in cross-border investment
for the past ten years as sample for this research. First, I limit the vintage year to the range 
of January 1, 2008–February 16, 2018, and ran a search for all “Buyout,” “PE [Private
Equity] Growth–Expansion,” and “Diversified PE” funds in the PitchBook database. Then
I excluded the following funds: (1) funds that did not have any investors known to the
Pitchbook, (2) funds that do not offer any geographical indication, (3) the country where
the fund is domiciled and the country where the fund makes investment were identical— 
to ensure the funds are engaging in cross-border investment, and (4) funds in the promotion
stage or the early investment period that are still selling securities to the investors. 
The above search rendered 763 funds, for which PitchBook offers detailed information 
of some investors known to PitchBook, including the identity of investors and their commitment
amount. However, because PitchBook data primarily relies on the private reporting by
investors, it does not offer the total number of investors in a particular fund. That information
is available at EDGAR database thanks to its Form D filings. So, I compared the initial 
result obtained from PitchBook with figures available in Section 14 of Form D and excluded
funds that did not have Form D filings listed on the EDGAR database. This left 303 funds 
remaining. Further research methodology is on file with the author.
304. According to the reports for year 2017 published the Investment Company Institute 
(ICI), 56.2 million households out of the total of 126.2 million households in the United
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More detailed information on the identity of the investors is currently 
available for about fifteen investors in PEFs, which is about 27% of the 
above fifty-seven average investors.305 Furthermore, information on the
commitment and investment amount of a particular investor is also available
for about twelve investors in PEFs—that is, about 21% of the above fifty-
seven average investors.306 
FIGURE 12. AVERAGE NUMBER OF LPS
The missing detailed information might be obtainable through the newly
enhanced exchange of tax information system, such as FATCA, AEOI, and 
DAC6. The global efforts to enhance tax transparency and the exchange 
States owned mutual funds. See DANIEL SCHRASS & MICHAEL BOGDAN, INV. CO. INST.,
PROFILE OF MUTUAL FUND SHAREHOLDERS, 2017, at 5 fig.1.1 (2017), https://www.ici.org/pdf/ 
rpt_17_profiles17.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6QX-ZW78]. To find the average number of households 
per mutual fund, the number of owning households is multiplied by 6, the mean number of 
mutual funds owned by U.S. households, and then divided by the number of funds in the 
United States, 9,799. 
 (owning Households) x (mean number of funds owned  =  (56,200,00)x(6)  = 34,411
 Total number of funds    9,799  
Id. at 13 fig.1.6; EUROPEAN FUND & ASSET MGMT. ASS’N, WORLDWIDE REGULATED OPEN-
ENDED FUND ASSETS AND FLOWS: TRENDS IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 2018 tbl.7 (2018), 
https://www.efama.org/Publications/Statistics/International/Quarterly%20%20International/
180928_International%20Statistical%20Release%20Q2%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9RGT-F47Z]; INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS 
AND ACTIVITIES IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 242 app. A (57th ed. 2017), https:// 
www.ici.org/pdf/2017_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR82-33A2].
305. Data on file with the author and available upon request.
306. Id. 
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of information, in addition to these empirical findings, further may make 
the Proposal more promising and administrable. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The basic goal of a pass-through tax regime is tax neutrality between
direct and indirect taxation. Tax neutrality is generally accomplished in the
domestic tax system. However, tax neutrality failed in the international tax 
system, particularly in multinational settings. Current international tax regime 
results in either over-taxation or under-taxation for investors in multinational 
investment funds. 
Thus, this Article offers the Proposal of making pass-through taxation 
work in multinational jurisdictions. Suppose that a fund distributes 100%
of its income to its investors, and as a result, it eliminates any substantial 
tax liability in the intermediate jurisdictions other than country of source 
and residence. In this scenario, such an investment scheme would qualify
for international pass-through taxation. The difference between the Proposal
and the OECD’s approach is that the Proposal gives primary tax authority 
to the source country and residence country rather than intermediary countries. 
Furthermore, this Article shows the prospect of implementing the Proposal in
the case of PEFs, inspired by PEFs’ unique features promoting administrability 
of the Proposal.
This Article fills the gap in international tax scholarship, which lacks 
the systematic analysis in foreign indirect investment. However, there are
many issues in cross-border fund investment that are not fully addressed
in this Article, such as deferral of income and allocation of tax jurisdictions
among relevant countries.  Moreover, the global community needs to improve
the EOI system to apply it to fund investments. All those topics are future 
research topics that can be built upon the ideas of this Article.
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VII. APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE COMPARING THE TAX ANALYSIS OF
DIRECT INVESTMENT AND INDIRECT INVESTMENT
Assumptions 
 Tax treaty between Country A and Country B: 0% withholding (WH)
tax on dividend, 10% WH tax on interest. 
 Tax treaty between Country A and Country D: 15% WH tax on
dividend, 12% WH tax on interest.
 Country B provides holding company regime similar to Luxembourg. 
Country C provides offshore pass-through tax regime similar to
the Cayman Islands. Tax amount payable to Countries B and C is
nominal enough to be ignored. 
 Country D has a worldwide tax regime with FTC and will apply a
35% tax rate on the foreign source income, except for dividend
and capital gains, which it will tax at a 20% rate. It also provides a
special tax regime for a tax-exempt organization (EO), which exempts
tax on interest, dividends, and capital gains but imposes tax on 
unrelated business taxable income (UBTI). Assume income received 
by an EO is not UBTI.
 If Country A determines that it is a tax avoiding transaction, it will 
deny treaty benefits between Countries A and B and apply domestic 
tax law, the maximum tax rate of which on dividend and interest
of nonresident is 30%. 
775
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a. Direct IOOdiv@ 15% WH = 100 div income@20% = 20 20 
Investment 15 (FTC 15) 
Tax payable to D = 5 
IfEO, 15 
Tax payable to D = 0 
b. Indirect !OOd1v@O% WH = 0 0 0 100 div income@20% = 20 20 
Investment (No FTC) 
(treaty Tax payable to D = 20 
shopping) IfEO, 0 
Tax payable to D = 0 
c. Indirect 100div@30% WH = 0 0 70* div income@20% = 14 44 
investment 30 (No FTC)** 
(challenged Tax payable to D = 14 
by A) IfEO, 30 
Tax payable to D = 0 
Problem 1: Target company in Country D distributes 100 of dividend. 
a. Direct investment between Country A and Country D
b. Indirect investment (treaty between Countries A and B is applicable, 
not challenged by Country A) 
c. Indirect investment (treaty between Countries A and B is not 
applicable, challenged by Country A)
* Only 70 will be considered as taxable income from Country D’s 
perspective under the bilateral approach. 
**   No FTC is allowed as to the tax paid to Country A for the purpose 
of income tax in Country D under the bilateral approach. 
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a. Direct SO div@ 15% WH =7.5 50 div income @ 20% = I 0 27.5 
Investment 50 int @ 12% WH = 6 50 int income @35% = 17.5 
Total tax payable to A = 13.5 (FTC 13 5) 
Ta'< payable to D = 14 
IfEO, 13.5 
Tax payable to D = 0 
b. Indirect 50 div @ 0% WH = 0 0 0 Gross income = 95 24.75 
Investment 50 int @10%WH=5 90•• div income @ 20% = 
(treaty Total tax payable to A= 5 18 
applied) 5* int income @35% = 1.75 
(No FTC)* .. 
Tax payable to D = 19.75 
IfEO, 
Tax payable to D = 0 
c. Indirect 50div@30% WH = 15 0 0 Gross mcome = 70 44.75 
Investment 50 int @30% WH = 15 6s•• div income@ 20% = 
(challenged Total tax payable to A = 30 13 
by A) 5* int income @35% = 1.75 
(No FTC) 
Tax payable to D = 14 75 
IfEO, 30 
Tax payable to D = 0 
[VOL. 56: 707, 2019] Engineering Pass-Throughs in International Tax 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Problem 2: Target company in Country D distributes 50 of dividend and
50 of interest, but the character of such income will be recharacterized when 
Country B distributes such income for the tax purposes of Country D.  Assume 
that only 5 will be characterized as interest, and the remaining will be 
characterized as dividend. 
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* Only 5 out of the total income received is characterized as interest.
** In the indirect investment where the treaty between Countries A
and B is applicable, only 95 out of 100 is taxable income from Country 
D’s perspective, and 90 out of 95 is dividend. In the indirect
investment where the treaty is not applicable, only 70 out of 100 is 
taxable income from Country D’s perspective, and 65 out of 70
is dividend. 
*** No FTC is allowed as to the tax paid to Country A for the purpose 
of income tax in Country D under the bilateral approach. 
Analysis 
a. represents a simple FDI scenario, not involving a fund vehicle.
b. represents treaty shopping scenarios. Compared to a., a taxpayer is paying
less tax, and the residence country is likely getting more revenue, while
the source country is losing its revenue.
c. represents ex post, unilateral adjustments by source country.  The taxpayer 
has to pay too much tax and the source country is collecting  too
much tax, compared to both a. and b. How the residence country’s
revenue would be changed is not certain.
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